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Abstract
Cloud computing is adopted by most organizations due to its characteristics, namely
offering on-demand resources and services that can quickly be provisioned with minimal
management effort and maintenance expenses for its users. However it still suffers from
security incidents which have lead to many data security concerns and reluctance in
further adherence. With the advent of these incidents, cryptographic technologies such
as homomorphic and searchable encryption schemes were leveraged to provide solutions
that mitigated data security concerns.
The goal of this thesis is to provide a set of secure abstractions to serve as a tool for
programmers to develop their own distributed applications. Furthermore, these abstrac-
tions can also be used to support trusted cloud computations in the context of NoSQL
data stores. For this purpose we leveraged conflict-free replicated data types (CRDTs) as
they provide a mechanism to ensure data consistency when replicated that has no need
for synchronization, which aligns well with the distributed and replicated nature of the
cloud, and the aforementioned cryptographic technologies to comply with the security
requirements. The main challenge of this thesis consisted in combining the cryptographic
technologies with the CRDTs in such way that it was possible to support all of the data
structures functionalities over ciphertext while striving to attain the best security and
performance possible.
To evaluate our abstractions we conducted an experiment to compare each secure
abstraction with their non secure counterpart performance wise. Additionally, we also
analysed the security level provided by each of the structures in light of the cryptographic
scheme used to support it. The results of our experiment shows that our abstractions
provide the intended data security with an acceptable performance overhead, showing
that it has potential to be used to build solutions for trusted cloud computation.
Keywords: Trusted cloud computing, Homomorphic Encryption, Searchable Encryption,
Data Abstractions, CRDTs
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Resumo
O paradigma de computação na nuvem é adoptado pela maioria das organizações
devido às suas características, isto é por providenciar recursos e serviços on-demand com
custos de gestão e manutenção mínimos para os utilizadores. Todavia, existem vários
incidentes relativos à segurança dos dados alojados na nuvem. Como tal, surgiram preo-
cupações quanto ao grau de segurança da nuvem o que por sua vez despoletou relutância
a uma maior adesão aos seus serviços. No seguimento dos incidentes, surgiram soluções
que se baseiam em tecnologias criptográficas, como cifras homomórficas e pesquisáveis,
e que permitem mitigar os problemas de segurança.
O objectivo desta tese consiste em disponibilizar um conjunto de abstracções seguras
que permitem desenvolver aplicações distribuidas e seguras e que possibilitem a compu-
tação confiável na nuvem no contexto de bases de dados NoSQL. Para o efeito, tomámos
partido de tipos abstractos de dados replicados e livres de conflito (CRDTs) dado que es-
tes fornecem um mecanismo que garante a consistência de dados quando replicados, sem
recorrer a sincronização, que se conjuga bem em ambientes distribuidos. Para cumprir
os requisitos de segurança, tomámos partido das tecnologias criptográficas previamente
referidas. O principal desafio desta tese consistiu em combinar estas tecnologias com os
CRDTs de forma a ser possível suportar todas as suas funcionalidades sobre texto cifrado
e de forma a garantir o melhor grau de segurança e desempenho possível.
Para efeitos de avaliação experimental, comparamos o desempenho das abstracções
seguras com as suas respectivas abstrações não seguras. Adicionalmente, também efectu-
amos uma análise do nível de segurança providênciado pelas estruturas desenvolvidas
em função das tecnologias criptográficas subjacentes às mesmas. Os resultados obtidos
demonstram que as abstracções cumprem com os requisitos de segurança pretendidos
com uma penelização de desempenho aceitável, o que revela o seu potencial para serem
utilizadas em soluções para computação confiável na cloud.
Palavras-chave: Computação confiável na nuvem, Esquemas de Cifras Homomórficas,
Esquemas de Cifras Pesquisáveis, Abstrações de Dados, CRDTs, SGX
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1
Introduction
1.1 Context
The cloud computing paradigm has received a substantial amount of attention in the
past decade. It emerged as a computational paradigm for on-demand network access to a
shared pool of computing resources such as network, servers, storage, applications, and
services that can be quickly provisioned with minimal management effort and mainte-
nance expenses [42].
Due to its characteristics it sparked a shift of computer processing, storage, and soft-
ware provisioning away from the desktop and local servers into the next generation of
data centers which are hosted by large infrastructure companies such as Amazon, Google,
Yahoo, Microsoft, or Sun. In fact, many applications have been created in or migrated to
cloud environments over the last few years [32].
Parallel to the increase in its popularity, the concern for the security and privacy
issues inherent to cloud computing also grew. From the consumer’s perspective, the
concern stems from the fact that they have little or no control over their data or the
applications and infrastructure involved since the cloud services are delivered by a cloud
service provider and accessed via the Internet. As a consequence, many companies which
deal with more sensitive data became skeptical and refrained further adoption of cloud
solutions. From the perspective of cloud service providers, the security concern derives
from their vulnerabilities to attacks and failure in equipment, software and controls [11].
Amongst its many security issues, data security which refers to the protection of
data privacy and integrity throughout its life cycle is the most pressing one [19]. Its a
particularly challenging issue because besides data owners not having full control of the
data life cycle, data locality and jurisdictional issues can prevent cloud service providers
from protecting personal information.
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The most common solution to mitigate data security issues is through encryption and
key management [11, 18, 50]. For effective encryption, the encryption algorithm and key
strength must also be taken into consideration.
Intuitively, the encryption solution would consist in the owner encrypting the data,
with conventional encryption before sending it to the cloud and when needed, he would
decrypt the data after retrieving it from the cloud. This solution allows to safely store
the data in the cloud, yet it becomes unsuitable when computations or queries must
be performed over the data, which typically is the case, as it places the burden of such
operations on the client-side and it wastes the cloud’s computation resources that could
be put to use to perform the operations more efficiently.
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
Encryption schemes that enable operations over ciphertext, such as homomorphic [13,
48] and searchable [16] encryption schemes, have been leveraged to benefit from cloud
computing while still preserving data security. Furthermore, these schemes enabled
secure computations to be performed in the cloud as they ensure the correctness as well
as the privacy of such operations despite the fact that they are executed in untrusted
cloud servers. Considerable amount of research was done in order to provide solutions
for secure computing, which could then be leveraged for cloud computing based on the
aforementioned encryption schemes like encrypted relational databases such as CryptDB
[51] and Cipherbase [6]. These solutions meet the security requirements with acceptable
overheads to the overall performance of the system.
In the past years with the advance of Web technologies, the integration and prolifera-
tion of sensors in multiple devices and mobile devices that are connected to the Internet
and the increase of volume of data generated by businesses, unprecedented amounts of
data for which storage and processing capabilities are need have been produced [32]. As
traditional relational databases became inadequate to deal with such amounts of data, a
new type of data store emerged — Not Only SQL (NoSQL). These are highly available,
scalable and fault-tolerant and therefore are very suitable to be used within the cloud
context. High availability is mostly provided through replication mechanisms [22], which
raises the issue of maintaining the replicated data consistent and solving conflicts of con-
current manipulation of different copies of the data. Conflict free replicated data types
(CRDT) [64] are data abstractions that address this issue by providing a built-in conflict
resolution mechanism that doesn’t require synchronization. Riak [54] is an example of a
NoSQL data store that provides such structures.
However when compared to the relational database systems, NoSQL data stores offer a
smaller set of security mechanisms [32, 43]. To improve the offer and richness of security
mechanisms in these stores, there has been research efforts to provide solutions for this
issue such as the framework to preserve privacy presented by Macedo et. al. [40]. The
proposed framework enables data processing over multiple cryptographic techniques and
2
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is composable with many NoSQL engines. This solution can be configured for different
security requirements and is able to meet them with an acceptable overhead to the overall
performance of the system.
In summary, when it comes to the development of secure databases, either relational
or NoSQL, through the use of cryptographic techniques there is a trade off between perfor-
mance and security. Providing strong security might lead to a system that is not available
nor scalable. Conversely, providing low or no security in order to match performance
requirements can lead to data security breaches.
In this thesis the problem we focus on is how can we security enhance NoSQL
databases while keeping to a minimum the impact on the performance of the database
itself and, most importantly, without restricting the ability to perform computations over
the stored data.
In this thesis we focus on the problem of how can we enhance the security of NoSQL
databases while keeping to a minimum the impact on the performance of the database
itself and, most importantly, without restricting the ability to perform computations over
the stored data.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
This thesis aimed to develop a set of secure abstractions to support secure computations
in the context of NoSQL data stores hosted by cloud services and to serve as a tool for
programmers to develop their own distributed applications. In the scope of this thesis, the
term security refers to the ability of maintaining the data involved in the computations
confidentiality and privacy protected.
To achieve this we leveraged CRDTs as their characteristics make them suitable to
be used in distributed systems or applications and encryption schemes, such as homo-
morphic encryption, to enable operations over the abstractions with security guarantees.
The secure abstractions include typical data-structures that form the backbone of today’s
more complex distributed and cloud applications. The main challenge of this thesis con-
sisted in combining the encryption schemes with the CRDTs in such way that it was
possible to support all of the data structures functionalities over ciphertext while striving
to attain the best security and performance possible.
In our threat model we consider a cloud administrator adversary which is of the type
Honest but Curious (HbC) [19]. This administrator has access to the cloud provider’s
infrastructure and software platforms which consequently provides him access to cus-
tomer data. The HbC administrator main goal is to gather as much information about the
computations and data as possible in order to infer their nature.
To understand the impact the security enhanced CRDTs, we performed micro bench-
marks to compare performance wise each secure abstraction with their non secure counter-
part. Additionally, we also analysed the security level provided by each of the structures
in light of the cryptographic scheme used to support it.
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In essence, we made the following contributions:
1. Design and implementation of a library of CRDTs;
2. Design and implementation of a library of secure CRDTs, which is a variant of
the aforementioned library, supported by cryptographic primitives with property-
preserving and homomorphic properties;
3. Extensively evaluate the developed contributions regarding both libraries.
1.4 Document Structure
This document is structured in six chapters, including the current one. Chapter 2 contains
the related work of this thesis, which consist in hardware-backed trusted computing
solutions, computing on encrypted data and data stores and models. Along the chapter
there are subsections dedicated to discuss in some capacity each of the addressed topics,
and in at the end of it there is a summary of these discussions. Chapter 3 provides an
overview of our solution, addressing its system and threat model, and Chapter 4 describes
the technical implementation aspects of the solution. On Chapter 5, the description of
the experimental evaluations we performed is given along with their results and critical
analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 presents our conclusion, contributions and future work.
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Related Work
This chapter is structured in 3 sections. In the first two sections, we will discuss different
solutions which provide privacy, availability and integrity of outsourced data in the cloud.
Section 2.1 discusses trusted computing solutions which are based in hardware, section
2.2 addresses solutions based on cryptography. In the last section (2.3) NoSQL stores are
analysed as a solution for distributed storage systems.
2.1 Hardware-backed Trusted Computing
Trusted computing refers to the expectation of technologies to not compromise their
claimed security properties. These properties are enforced through hardware/software
solutions. The hardware approach to trusted computing is referred to as Trusted Hard-
ware [67].
In this section we will discuss the state of the art of implementations of trusted hard-
ware, focusing on the most relevant solutions for trusted execution environments (TEE)
solutions — Intel’s SGX [20]) and ARM’s Trustzone[8] — while still addressing Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM) [68] as it is at the core of trusted hardware.
2.1.1 Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)
A TEE is a secure, integrity-protected execution environment, consisting of processing,
memory, and storage capabilities that is isolated from the normal execution environment
[10]. In this context, isolation refers to the ability to run security-critical code outside the
control of the normal execution environment which is not trusted.
A TEE architecture may support one or more TEE instances. Architectures based
on dedicated security chips and processor modes (e.g. TPMs [68] and ARM’s TrustZone
[58]), often have only one instance available. In this scenario, the same instance typically
5
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allows execution of multiple trusted applications. Additionally, an interface that enables
communication with trusted applications and invocation of cryptographic operations
within the TEE is provided to applications from the normal execution environment.
Architectures based on virtualization ( e.g. Terra [29], TCCP [56]) and emerging
processor architectures (e.g. Intel SGX [20]) allow the normal execution environment
application to create or activate a TEE instance when needed through an application pro-
gramming interface (API). This API allows the application to execute trusted applications
and to read and write data to and from them.
2.1.2 Trusted Platform Modules
A TPM is a hardware module incorporated and deployed in a motherboard, smart card or
processor that provides the resources needed for trusted computing. As shown in Figure
2.1, the TPM has several components.
  
 
I/O
Crytographic
co-processor
HMAC
engine
SHA-1
engine
Opt-in
Nonvolatile
memory
Trusted platform module (TPM)
Packaging
Volatile
memory
Execution
engine
Power
detection
Random number
generator
Key
generation
 
Figure 2.1: TPM architecture (taken from [67]).
Through secret sharing and cooperation with other hardware and software compo-
nents, the TPM provisions three services: authenticated boot, certification, and encryp-
tion.
The authenticated boot service allows to verify that the boot of the entire operating
system is made in well defined stages at which only approved versions of the modules
of the OS are loaded. This could be done by verifying a digital signature associated with
each module. Additionally, a tamper-proof log of the loading process is kept by the TPM
that later can be consulted. Tampering is detected using cryptographic hash functions.
It is also possible to configure the TPM to include additional hardware, application and
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utility software in its trust computing base (TCB) given some restrictions to prevent
threats. This service can be used to guarantee that the machine which hosts the TPM is
in a well defined and trusted state after booting.
Through the certification service TPMs support attestation. Attestation is a security
mechanism that allows a third party to verify that the contents of a secure container,
provided by trusted hardware, is as expected. Typically the proof consists in a piece of
attestation data signed by the trusted hardware, producing an attestation signature.
In the TPM the attestation data is the log of the loading process produced by the
authenticated boot service. The data is then signed, using a private key exclusive to
attestation, and a digital signature certificate is produced. Upon receiving the certificate,
the third party only needs to verify the signature using the TPM’s public key. The third
party can trust this proof because the TPM is considered trustworthy and only the TPM
possesses its private key. To prevent message replay attacks, a nonce is sent along with
the certification request issued by the third party.
The encryption service enables the encryption of data that can only be decrypted
by a machine with a certain configuration. For this purpose, a secret key is generated
from a never exposed master secret key owned by the TPM and which is unique to each
machine. The key generation algorithm used by the TPM generates keys for every possible
machine configuration and then binds each key to the corresponding configuration. Thus,
the configuration of the machine at the time of encryption must match the configuration
when decryption occurs for it to succeed. Applications can leverage this service to encrypt
data while running in a machine whose configuration is trusted and safe by wrapping
the key used for data encryption with a key provided by the TPM. When decryption of
the data is required, the wrapped key is submitted to the TPM to be unwrapped. The
TPM verifies if the current system configuration allows access for the key required for
unwrapping and if the application that issued the request is authorized to access it. If so,
the original key is returned, and the application can decrypt its data.
TPMs can provide more minimal TEEs. This can be achieved through the certification
service as after the validation of the correctness and integrity of the software stack that
runs on the TPM enabled machine, an trusted execution environment with processing,
memory, and storage capabilities has been secured. This TEE is considered more minimal
as there isn’t complete isolation of the environment.
Santos et. al. [57] leveraged TPMs to provide a policy-sealed data abstraction. This
abstraction allows customer data to be bound to cloud nodes whose configuration is
specified by a customer-defined policy. A configuration consists in a set of attributes that
express features that refer to the node’s software or hardware. A policy expresses a logical
condition over the attributes that must be supported by the provider.
7
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2.1.2.1 Security Overview
TPM’s can suffer 3 types of attacks: software, reset and timing attacks. Physical attacks
to the TPM are excluded from its threat model [66].
Software attacks target the attestation service. The main issue is that the configuration
that is certified may not be the one that is currently in the system as the measurements are
taken upon loading of the system. Given an application software that has been configured
in the TPM, an adversary can still exploit the difference between the instant when the
software is measured and when it is actually used to induce run-time vulnerabilities [14].
These attacks are classified as time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU). A possible solution
is to have the system where the TPM lives monitor the state of memory of the application
it is attesting to. Upon change, either the changes are incorporated in the measurement
or they are reported to the operating system.
Reset attacks [66] are characterized by instructing the TPM to perform a hardware
reset, even if the rest of the system is not instructed to restart, which will make it return
to its uninitialized state. Thereafter, a malicious configuration can be setup on the TPM
as follows. Before instructing the TPM to restart, the attacker obtains copies of the digital
signatures of the trusted configuration which were fed to the authenticated boot service.
Then the attacker swaps the operating system for a malicious one by exchanging the
machine’s hard drive, for example. Upon booting, the hardware reset must be issued
to the TPM and the malicious operating system must feed the TPM with the previously
obtained signatures of the trusted configuration. At the end of the attack, the malicious
operating system will be able to perform whichever operations were bound to the trusted
configuration.
To carry out the previously described attack, its is necessary to record the trusted
boot process. This is achieved through timing attacks, more specifically by snooping
the unsecure communication channel between the TPM and CPU at instances where it
is known sensitive information is being exchanged (e.g. startup) [38]. This attack is
easily circumvented by the creation of an encrypted channel. According to the TPM
specification [68], its possible to create one although there is still doubt if the processor
will be able to secure one with the TPM.
2.1.3 Intel SGX
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a set of x86 instructions and memory access
changes to the Intel architecture [41, 47]. SGX is leveraged by applications to ensure con-
fidentiality and integrity guarantees, even when the privileged software on the computer
where security sensitive computations are being performed are not trusted.
These guarantees are provided through the use of a TEE referred to as an enclave. An
enclave is a protected physical memory region isolated from the remainder code of the
system, including the operating system and hypervisor. Each enclave contains the code
and the data required to perform the security-sensitive computations which is provided
8
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by the user. Therefore, the trusted computing base (TCB) of Intel’s SGX is composed by
the processor and code chosen by the user [9, 60].
Isolation is achieved by storing the enclave’s code and data, which corresponds to
the security sensitive computation’s data and code, in the Processor Reserved Memory
(PRM) which is memory that can’t be directly accessed by other software. This memory
is encrypted and integrity protected at all times, except when moved to the processor.
Any other enclave specific information is stored in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC),
which is a subset of the PRM and it is managed by the system software (e.g. hypervisor).
This implies that although the system software is not trusted, it is still relied upon to
manage an enclave. Multiple enclaves are supported by having the EPC fragmented in
pages that can be assigned to different enclaves [20]. However, as the enclave’s memory
has an imposed limit of either 64MB or 128MB, the number of active enclave’s, i.e. in
memory, is limited [35].
To leverage Intel’s SGX without compromising the offered security guarantees and
injecting vulnerabilities, the submitted code must comply with the following guidelines:
• It must be divided in two logical components: trusted and untrusted. The trusted
component defines the security sensitive computations. It represents the enclave.
The untrusted component defines the rest of required operations;
• The trusted component should be as small as possible. It should only operate over
secret data;
• The trusted component code may access unprotected memory and call functions in
the untrusted component although there should be a minimal dependency on the
untrusted component.
An enclave’s life cycle can be described as a finite state machine as shown in Figure 2.2.
Table 2.1 describes the most relevant instructions which coincide with state transitions.
Table 2.1: Main instructions of an enclave’s life cycle.
Instruction Description
ECREATE Creates an enclave by setting up the it’s internal data structures, which
are allocated within the PRM, with information retrieved from unsafe
memory regions.
EADD Loads the initial code and data into the enclave from unsafe memory
regions.
EEXTEND Updates the enclave’s measurement which is used in the software attes-
tation process.
EINIT Marks the enclave’s internal data structures as initialized which enables
its for execution.
EREMOVE Terminates an enclave by deallocating all of it’s memory.
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Figure 62: A possible layout of an enclave’s virtual address space.
Each enclave has a SECS, and one TCS per supported concurrent
thread. Each TCS points to a sequence of SSAs, and specifies initial
values for RIP and for the base addresses of FS and GS.
Each SSA starts at the beginning of an EPC page, and
uses up the number of EPC pages that is specified in the
SSAFRAMESIZE field of the enclave’s SECS. These
alignment and size restrictions most likely simplify the
SGX implementation by reducing the number of special
cases that it needs to handle.
An enclave thread’s execution context consists of
the general-purpose registers (GPRs) and the result of
the XSAVE instruction (§ 2.6). Therefore, the size of
the execution context depends on the requested-feature
bitmap (RFBM) used by to XSAVE. All the code in an
enclave uses the same RFBM, which is declared in the
XFRM enclave attribute (§ 5.2.2). The number of EPC
pages reserved for each SSA, specified in SSAFRAME-
SIZE, must7 be large enough to fit the XSAVE output for
the feature bitmap specified by XFRM.
SSAs are stored in regular EPC pages, whose EPCM
page type is PT REG. Therefore, the SSA contents is
accessible to enclave software. The SSA layout is archi-
7ECREATE (§ 5.3.1) fails if SSAFRAMESIZE is too small.
tectural, and is completely documented in the SDM. This
opens up possibilities for an enclave exception handler
that is invoked by the host application after a hardware
exception occurs, and acts upon the information in a
SSA.
5.3 The Life Cycle of an SGX Enclave
An enclave’s life cycle is deeply intertwined with re-
source management, specifically the allocation of EPC
pages. Therefore, the instructions that transition between
different life cycle states can only be executed by the
system software. The system software is expected to
expose the SGX instructions described below as enclave
loading and teardown services.
The following subsections describe the major steps in
an enclave’s lifecycle, which is illustrated by Figure 63.
Uninitialized
Initialized
Not in use
Non-
existing ECREATE
Initialized
In use
EINIT
EENTER
ERESUME
EEXIT
AEX
EREMOVE
EADD
EEXTEND
EBLOCK
ETRACK
ELDU, ELDB
EWB
EBLOCK
ETRACK
ELDU, ELDB
EGETKEY
EREPORT
Figure 63: The SGX enclave life cycle management instructions
and state transition diagram
5.3.1 Creation
An enclave is born when the system software issues the
ECREATE instruction, which turns a free EPC page into
the SECS (§ 5.1.3) for the new enclave.
ECREATE initializes the newly created SECS using
the information in a non-EPC page owned by the system
software. This page specifies the values for all the SECS
fields defined in the SDM, such as BASEADDR and
SIZE, using an architectural layout that is guaranteed to
be preserved by future implementations.
While is very likely that the actual SECS layout used
by initial SGX implementations matches the architec-
tural layout quite closely, future implementations are
free to deviate from this layout, as long as they main-
tain the ability to initialize the SECS using the archi-
tectural layout. Software cannot access an EPC page
that holds a SECS, so it cannot become dependent on
an internal SECS layout. This is a stronger version of
63
Figure 2.2: Intel SGX’s enclave life cycle (taken from [20]).
SGX, similarly to TPMs, also provides attestation. In Intel’s SGX, the proof consists in
a cryptographic signature that certifies a measurement of the secure container contents
which was computed t the creation of the nclav . The signing of the measurement is
performed by a privileged enclave, the Quoting Enclave, that can access the required
attestation key.
Intel’s SGX originally was designed for securing small services but as cloud computing
has become a big trend, it has been leveraged to provide security guarantees to applica-
tions deployed in the cloud. One example is VC3 [60], proposed by Schuster et. al., which
allows users to run distributed MapReduce computations in the cloud while keeping
the d ta and code private. Another example is the solution developed by Ohrimenko
et. al. [47], which consists in a set of data-oblivious machine learning algorithms for
collaborative data analytics that maintains individual datasets private.
2.1.3.1 Security Overview
The threat model of SGX includes the following category of attacks [20]:
• Privileged software attacks: most Intel processors support hyper-threading which
means that the CPUs, execution units and caches on a single core are shared by two
logic processors (LP), with each having their own state. As SGX doesn’t prevent
hyper-threading, malicious system software may leverage this feature to carry out
an attack. Specifically, it can schedule a thread that is executing the code of an
enclave on an LP that shares its core with another LP that is executing a snooping
thread. This allows for the snooping thread to learn the instructions executed by
the enclave and its memory access patterns;
• Memory mapping attacks: SGX is vulnerable to passive address translation attacks,
due to using the address translation process provided by the system software, which
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can be leveraged to learn the enclave’s memory access patterns at page granularity;
• Software side-channel attacks: SGX doesn’t provide protection against software
side-channel attacks that rely on performance counters which can leak information
about the enclave.
Categories such as physical attacks to the CPU chip, side-channel attacks and cache
timing attacks do not feature in its threat model. Nevertheless, researchers are still
actively proposing new solutions for the last two categories as new forms of attacks are
discovered. This could be due to the popularity of SGX for cloud applications.
In [65], the authors address page-fault-based side channel attacks which allows the
malicious OS to gain complete control over the execution of SGX programs by stopping
the program, unmapping the target’s memory pages and resuming execution. To mitigate
this attack, the Transaction Synchronization Extensions (TSX) of Intel processors are used
to abort ongoing transactions upon unexpected exceptions or interrupts. The authors of
[61] address memory corruption attacks with a new Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) scheme built on top of SGX that secretly bootstraps the memory space layout with
a finer-grained randomization.
2.1.4 ARM Trustzone
ARM’s TrustZone is the security extension made to ARM’s System-On-Chip (SoC) that
covers the processor, memory, and peripherals [58]. It provides a hardware-level isolation
between two execution domains: the normal world and secure world. The secure world
hosts a secure container while the normal world runs an untrusted software stack [15].
These domains have independent memory address spaces and different operating
systems and privileges: while code running in the normal world cannot access the secure
world address space, code running in the secure world can access the normal world
address space.
On boot, the processor initializes in the secure world and then sets up the necessary
environment before switching to the normal world. As such, the TrustZone’s TCB consists
in the boot loader, the processor and the software that will run in the trusted world. When
required, the execution can switch into the secure world using the secure-monitor call
(SMC) instruction. The SMC instruction generates a software interruption that is trapped
by the chosen secure monitor implementation. Additionally, interrupt requests can be
configured to be secure or non-secure and are handled accordingly. Therefore, secure
interrupts will only be handled by the secure world. This mechanism alongside the
supervision of the CPU state through the NS bit, which indicates the current world of the
processor, and the partitioning of the memory address space into secure and non-secure
regions guarantees the isolation between worlds.
To use the secure services provided in the secure world, communication between
worlds is provided through shared memory. This memory is physically allocated in the
11
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Figure 2.3: Example of a system architecture using the TrustZone API (taken and adapted
from [8]).
normal world’s memory region. Processes within the secure world can still gain access
to it, due to having higher privilege, by mapping a normal world address to its page
table [37]. The shared memory is used to specify which services were required and the
necessary input arguments.
Although ARM’s TrustZone can also be leveraged for cloud applications, it has been
more exploited in mobile devices as its architecture is present in many of them for over a
decade. Examples of such is the API of Ekberg et. al. [23] that provisions trusted applica-
tions and secrets to the device, authorizes trusted applications to access the provisioned
secrets and device keys, and control which normal world application can execute trusted
applications and the system proposed by Santos et. al. [58] that protects confidentiality
and integrity of .NET mobile applications from OS security breaches. Darkroom [15] is
an example of the use of TrustZone for cloud applications. It enables users to securely
process image data in the cloud while preventing the exposure of sensitive data to the
operating system.
2.1.4.1 Security Overview
TrustZone can be configured to provide countermeasures for different threats, therefore
it doesn’t possess a fixed threat model. To build a configuration that meets a threat model
specification, security protocols must be built on top of TrustZone (e.g. attestation) and
combined with parts of the system which are made secure through TrustZone’s architec-
ture.
Nonetheless, attacks to the TrustZone architecture are still studied and identified by
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researchers. For an instance, Jang et. al. [37] addresses the unauthenticated access to
resources in TrustZone which makes the channel used for communication between worlds
vulnerable to an attacker with the normal world’s kernel privilege. The attack can consist
in creating a malicious process that continuously sends requests with crafted arguments
to discover the vulnerabilities of the resources in TrustZone. Another possibility is a
man-in-the-middle attack. To mitigate these attacks, the authors proposed a framework
that allows the creation of a secure channel for cross worlds communication.
2.1.5 Critical Analysis
As there is no specification related to the TPMs minimum performance requirements,
commodity TPMs are slow and inefficient due to the lack of incentive to use faster yet
more expensive internal components. Consequently, the usage of TPMs is limited to use
cases that don’t require fast nor frequent operations.
In general, a drawback of TEEs is the lack of standardization regarding an API for
developers to make use of which has hindered the development of real world applications
which leverage them. Yet, the Global Platform association and the Trusted Computing
Group have made standardization efforts as the interest and demand for greater levels of
security in applications arises [23].
2.2 Computing on Encrypted Data
In the context of cloud environments, computation security may be divided into two
classes — cloud storage security and cloud computing security [69]. Cloud storage se-
curity refers to ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of outsourced data stored at
untrustworthy cloud servers while cloud computing security refers to verifying the cor-
rectness of the outsourced computation performed by untrustworthy cloud servers. In
this section, we will discuss cryptographic schemes (2.2.1) and systems (2.2.2) that pro-
vide solutions for both classes.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Schemes
2.2.1.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption designates cryptographic schemes for which, given a fixed key,
it is equivalent to perform operations, specifically addition and/or multiplication, on
the plaintexts or on the corresponding ciphertexts [28]. In other words, these schemes
allow a set of operations to be performed directly over encrypted data with no need for
decryption while still obtaining the correct result.
These schemes enable the outsourcing of resource-intensive computing tasks to the
cloud while maintaining confidentiality. Next, three forms of homomorphic encryption
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will be presented — Fully, Partial and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption — where the
main difference among them is the set of operations allowed.
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes that a allow a variable yet finite num-
ber of operations to performed over ciphertext are referred to as Somewhat Homomorphic
Encryption (SHE or SWHE) schemes. The term somewhat is due to all schemes having the
following property: as the number of operations performed increases, the noise factor
increases exponentially and if a threshold p for this factor is exceeded, decryption of the
ciphertext is no longer possible. An example of such scheme is the one presented by
Boneh et. al. [13], which is a public key encryption scheme that allows addition and (very
limited) multiplication over ciphertexts through quadratic formulas.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption Firstly introduced by Rivest et al. in 1978 [55], Fully
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes allow an arbitrary number of operations to
be performed over ciphertext. Only in 2009 a feasible scheme was presented by Craig
Gentry [30]. It relied on a ideal lattice based SHE to which a boostrapping procedure was
applied, resulting in a reduction of the noise factor that transformed the SHE into a FHE.
Although it was an important achievement, this scheme is not usable in practice due to is
big overhead. Although other schemes have been proposed since, in general, albeit ideal,
FHE is impractical due to the overhead of the required computations that renders them
unable to meet performance requirements of applications.
Partial Homomorphic Encryption Due to the inefficiency of FHE, researchers devel-
oped Partial Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes which only allow a single opera-
tion over ciphertext. Typically, the operation is either addition or multiplication but never
both. These schemes are much more efficient and practical as they rely in conventional
cryptography such as public-key cryptography and modular arithmetic. An example of
such scheme is Paillier’s [48], which leveraged a trapdoor technique based on composite-
degree residues to allow addition over ciphertexts. Another example is ElGamal’s scheme
[24], which is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields
and allows multiplication over ciphertexts.
2.2.1.2 Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) is a solution which addresses the problem of
efficiently searching for keywords over remote encrypted data, where the underlying
cryptography is symmetric. In this problem typically there is a user, which owns the
data, and an untrusted server, where the encrypted data is stored [36]. The encryption
of the data is made by the user, who may organize it in an arbitrary way and include
additional data structures to allow for efficient access of relevant data [21]. With the
rise of cloud storage solutions, which motivates storage outsourcing, this problem gained
more attention and consequently so did searchable encryption schemes.
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To be able to search within ciphertexts, determinism is required both for efficiency
reasons and to actually match the queried keyword. However, determinism reveals in-
formation patterns to adversaries upon execution of certain operations (e.g. searches),
which may conflict with the desirable security guarantees [25].
An example of an SSE scheme is [16] which allows to search over encrypted records.
In this scheme for each record/keyword pair there is pseudo-random label. All labels and
corresponding record identifiers, which are encrypted, are kept in a generic dictionary
data structure in the server. Whenever a query is executed, the client computes a short
key derived from the label associated with the queried keyword. Then, the server uses this
short key to search the dictionary for the matching encrypted record identifiers. After
retrieving the identifiers, the client decrypts them and obtains the result of the query.
Besides searching, this scheme also allows to update the data set stored remotely.
Other examples of SSE schemes, that follow the approach of the aforementioned
scheme but go beyond text search, are BISEN [26] and MuSE [27]. BISEN allows to search
for documents matching a boolean expression with multiple keywords while MuSE allows
cloud-backed applications to dynamically store, update, and search datasets containing
multiple media formats.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Systems
2.2.2.1 CryptDB
CryptDB [51] is a middleware solution that provides confidentiality for applications that
use database management systems (DBMS) by enabling a range of SQL queries to be
made over encrypted data.
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CryptDB is careful about what relations between tuples it 
reveals to the DBMS server. To execute a GROUP BY on column c, 
for instance, the server need not know the order of the items 
in column c, nor any information about other columns. To 
execute an ORDER BY, or to find the MAX or MIN, CryptDB 
reveals the order of items in that column, but not otherwise.
CryptDB incorporates two techniques: SQL-aware encry-
ption and adjustable query-based encryption. SQL-aware 
encryp tion uses the observation that most SQL queries 
are made up of a well-defined set of basic operators, such 
as equality checks, order comparisons, aggregates (sums), 
and joins. CryptDB supports these operators over encrypted 
data. By adapting known encryption schemes (for equality, 
additions, and order checks), and using a new privacy- 
preserving cryptographic scheme for joins, CryptDB encry-
pts each data item in a way that allows the DBMS to execute 
on the transformed data.
The second technique is adjustable query-based encryp-
tion: CryptDB carefully adjusts the SQL-aware encryption 
scheme for any given data item to support different opera-
tions on this data. To implement these adjustments effi-
ciently, CryptDB uses onions of encryption. Onions are a novel 
way to compactly store multiple ciphertexts within each 
other in the database and avoid revealing weaker encryption 
schemes when they are not needed.
CryptDB provides confidentiality for the content of the 
data and for names of columns and tables, but does not 
hide the overall table structure, the number of rows, the 
types of columns, or the approximate size of data in bytes. 
The only information that CryptDB reveals to the DBMS 
server is relationships among data items correspond-
ing to  classes of computation that queries perform on the 
database, such as comparing items for equality, sorting, or 
performing word search. The granularity at which CryptDB 
allows the DBMS to perform a class of computations is an 
entire column (or a group of joined columns, for joins), 
which means that even if a query requires equality checks 
for a few rows, executing that query on the server would 
require revealing that class of computation for an entire 
column. Section 3.1 describes how these classes of com-
putation map to CryptDB’s encryption schemes, and the 
 information they reveal.
CryptDB provides the following properties:
2.1. threat 1: DBmS server compromise
CryptDB provides confidentiality (data secrecy) in the face 
of an attacker with full read access to the data stored in 
the DBMS server. The attacker is assumed to be passive: 
she wants to learn confidential data, but does not change 
queries issued by the application, query results, or the data 
in the DBMS. This threat includes DBMS software compro-
mises, root access to DBMS machines, and even access to 
the RAM of physical machines. With the rise in database 
consolidation inside enterprise data centers, outsourcing 
of databases to public cloud computing infrastructures, 
and the use of third-party DBAs, this threat is increasingly 
important. We focus on confidentiality, not data integrity 
or availability.
CryptDB addresses this threat by executing SQL que-
ries over encrypted data on the DBMS server. As shown in 
Figure 1, CryptDB works by intercepting all SQL queries 
in a trusted proxy; existing applications do not need to be 
modified to use CryptDB, but all queries must go through 
the proxy. The proxy stores a master secret key, which 
it uses to rewrite queries to execute on encrypted data. 
The proxy encrypts and decrypts all data, and changes 
some query operators, while preserving the semantics of 
the query. Because the DBMS server never receives decryp-
tion keys to the plaintext, it never sees sensitive data, 
ensuring that our passive adversary cannot gain access to 
private information.
The main challenge when executing queries on encryp-
ted data lies in the tension between minimizing the 
amount of confidential information revealed to the 
DBMS server and the ability to efficiently execute a vari-
ety of queries. Our strategy is to allow the DBMS server to 
perform query processing on encrypted data mostly as it 
would on an unencrypted database (important for practi-
cality), while restricting the server to computing only the 
functions required to process authorized queries (important 
for confidentiality). For example, if the DBMS needs to 
perform a GROUP BY on column c, the DBMS server should 
be able to determine which items in that column are equal 
to each other, but not the actual content of each item. 
Therefore, the proxy needs to enable the DBMS server to 
determine relationships among data items necessary to 
process a query.
Figure 1. CryptDB’s architecture consisting of two parts: a proxy and an unmodified DBMS. CryptDB uses user-defined functions (uDFs) 
to perform cryptographic operations in the DBmS. Rectangular and rounded boxes represent processes and data, respectively. Shading 
indicates components added by CryptDB. Dashed lines indicate separation between users’ computers, the application server, a server 
running CryptDB’s proxy (which is usu lly the same as the application server), and the DBmS server. the scope of the two threats CryptDB 
addresses is shown as dotted lines.
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Figure 2.4: CryptDB’s system architecture (taken from [51]).
It addresses two threats (Figure 2.4), specifically (1) an adversary who gains access to
the DBMS server and tries to learn priv te data and (2) a adversa y who gains comp ete
control over the application and DBMS servers. In the first threat, CryptDB aims to
prevent the adversary of learning private data and on the second threat it aims to protect
the confidentiality of data owned by users which are l gged-out f the application during
an attack, providing no such guarantees for logged-in users.
In this solution, a trusted proxy intercepts issued queries and transforms them so that
they may work over the encrypted data stored at the server while preserving the semantics
of the original query. Conversely, upon receiving a query result, the proxy transforms (i.e.
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decrypts) the result so that the application may process it. As such, the transformations
include encryption decryption, change of query operators and obfuscation of names of
columns and tables.
To mitigate information leakage due to some of the encryption schemes used (e.g.
OPE), an onion encryption mechanism is provided. This mechanism consists in compos-
ing different layers of encryption, which allow for different operations to be performed,
over a single data item in such a way that the weaker encryption scheme resides in the
innermost layer and the stronger scheme resides in the outermost layer of the onion.
2.2.2.2 Cipherbase
Cipherbase [6] is a full-fledged SQL database system, that extends Microsoft’s SQL Server,
which allows for organizations to leverage the advantages of cloud computing platforms
while providing data confidentiality by storing and processing encrypted data. It incor-
porates customized secure co-processors at the server side to distribute computations
between trusted hardware, which resides in a Trusted Machine (TM), and untrusted hard-
ware, which resides in an Untrusted Machine (UM). The secure co-processor in this
system is a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).
Client
App
Cipherbase Client
Modified SQL Server
(Untrusted Module)
PCIe
Encryption
Specification
FPGA
(Trusted Module)
Cloud ServerClient Machine
Fig. 3. Cipherbase Architecture
that a weak adversary does not learn any ordering or equality
information. A strong adversary learns equality information
for the queried portion of the index key space.
Transaction Processing: In Cipherbase, query processing hap-
pens in two steps: a one-time prepare step, followed by any
number of parametrized execution steps. During the prepare
step for a query Q, the Cipherbase client first identifies all
the TM programs required to evaluate expressions in Q and
registers these programs with the TM. The Cipherbase client
encrypts the programs to be registered to ensure that an
adversary does not learn their details. In particular, a TM
program can include internal constants and we leverage this to
hide query constants. After the TM programs are registered,
the client rewrites Q to reference the program handles returned
during registration. Consider the following parametrized query
Qex:
UPDATE Accounts SET Balance = Balance + @Amt
WHERE Id = @Id
Assume both Balance and Id columns are strongly en-
crypted, with an equality index on Id. This query requires
a TM program that takes in two strongly encrypted integers
and returns the strongly encrypted sum. Let 21 be the handle
for this program returned by the TM during registration1. The
original query is rewritten2 as Q′ex:
UPDATE Accounts
SET Balance = TMEval(21, Balance, @Amt)
WHERE Id = @Id
where TMEval is a new built-in function we have added
to SQL Server; TMEval is an n-ary function that invokes
a TM stack program. The rewritten query is PREPAREd in
the Cipherbase UMDBMS (SQL Server), which compiles and
caches the query plan. This PREPARE step has no knowledge
of encryption and is unmodified SQL Server code.
In our example query, assuming an index-based plan, the
equality index identifies the record with Id equal to the
encrypted @Id parameter. The encrypted Balance of this
record and the encrypted @Amt parameter are passed as inputs
to TM stack program 21, which returns the encrypted sum
of the two, which is used to update the Balance field. This
update happens in the UM and the Update operator “thinks”
it is replacing one binary value with another.
1We have added a new built-in function TMRegister() to SQL Server to
register stack programs.
2For simplicity, we show rewritten queries - see Appendix D for more
details.
During query execution, the Cipherbase client encrypts
any query parameters and runs the rewritten query at the
UMDBMS3. Query execution at the UMDBMS proceeds
largely agnostic to encryption, using unmodified SQL Server
code except for the two cases described earlier : (1) index
lookups over strongly encrypted data involve comparisons in
the TM and (2) any calls to the TMEval function are routed to
the TM. To the rest of the query processing system, TMEval
looks like any other n-ary built-in function.
Note that partial homomorphic encryption schemes such as
OPE or DET encryption can help avoid round-trips to the
TM. For instance, in the above example, if the Id column
is deterministically encrypted, then the index lookup does not
need to involve the TM (similar to the case when Id is in
plaintext).
The Cipherbase client ensures that the output of a TM
program is a strongly encrypted value, a cryptographic hash, or
a plaintext boolean. Specifically, the output of a TM program is
plaintext only for boolean operators (equality for joins/group-
by and filter predicates), which are consistent with the data
confidentiality guarantees in Section II-B.
Concurrency and Recovery: One of the main advantages of
our minimal TM design is that we inherit almost all SQL
Server concurrency and recovery features without making
any encryption-related modifications. SQL Server, like most
modern databases, uses a combination of latching and locking
to ensure physical and logical consistency. These primitives
are almost always acquired on physical structures, even for
logical concepts (e.g., physical record address for record level
locking), and work correctly since encrypted data is simply
stored as binary values. One subtlety relates to key-range
locking [20], where locks are obtained on leaf-level key values.
However, the correctness of this scheme relies only on the
keys being unique (the ordering information is implicit in the
position of the keys in the B-tree). Since uniqueness remains
unaffected when we replace plaintext keys with ciphertext
values, we do not require encryption-specific modifications for
key-range locking.
The ARIES-style recovery of SQL Server relies on physical
page-oriented redos and logical undos [21]. The correctness of
page-oriented redos relies only on the binary representation
of data and is unaffected by encryption. Logical undos are
affected by encryption, but use the same code path as regular
transaction processing. Thus, the query processing modifica-
tions described earlier are sufficient.
3We omit details of “type inferencing” to infer @Amt and @Id in the
example require strong encryption.
Figure 2.5: Cipherbase’s system architecture (taken from [7]).
When a client executes a query that requires computation over encrypted columns,
which are specified by the client, tuples are transferred from the UM to the TM. To obtain
and return the query result to the UM, which is encrypted, the tuples are decrypted,
processed and re-encrypt d by he TM. To this extend, Cipherbase simulates fully homo-
morphic encryption. However, if the tuples are encrypted with homomorphic schemes
their properties are used to perform the operations on the data in the UM.
2.2.2.3 Depsky
DepSky [12] is a middleware cloud storage solution that leverages different commercial
clouds, forming a cloud-of-clouds, to provide a dependable storage system with avail-
ability, integrity and confidentiality guarantees. To do so, DepSky employs an byzantine
fault-tolerant replication across the different clouds, a secret sharing scheme plus erasure
codes and encryption to store data.
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Content distribution. One of the most surprising uses of
Amazon S3 is content distribution [Henry 2009]. In this sce-
nario, users use the storage system as distribution points for
their data in such a way that one or more producers store
the content on their account and a set of consumers read this
content. A system like DEPSKY that supports dependable
updatable information storage can help this kind of appli-
cation when the content being distributed is dynamic and
there are security concerns associated. For example, a com-
pany can use the system to give detailed information about
its business (price, available stock, etc.) to its affiliates with
improved availability and security.
Future applications. Many applications are moving to the
cloud, so, it is possible to think of new applications that
would use the storage cloud as a back-end storage layer.
Systems like databases, file systems, objects stores and key-
value databases can use the cloud as storage layer as long
as caching and weak consistency models are used to avoid
paying the price of cloud access on every operation.
3. The DEPSKY System
This section presents the DEPSKY system. It starts by pre-
senting the system architecture, then defines the data and
system models, the two main algorithms (DEPSKY-A and
DEPSKY-CA), and a set of auxiliary protocols.
3.1 DEPSKY Architecture
Figure 1 presents the architecture of DEPSKY. As mentioned
before, the clouds are storage clouds without the capacity
of executing users’ code, so they are accessed using their
standard interface without modifications. The DEPSKY al-
gorithms are implemented as a software library in the clients.
This library offers an object store interface [Gibson 1998],
similar to what is used by parallel file systems (e.g., [Ghe-
mawat 2003, Weil 2006]), allowing reads and writes in the
back-end (in this case, the untrusted clouds).
 
Cloud 1                 Cloud 2                      Cloud 3                     Cloud 4 
DepSky cloud-of-clouds
Value 
(data) 
Value 
(data)
DS Client 1                                        DS Client 2
Figure 1. Architecture of DEPSKY (w/ 4 clouds, 2 clients).
3.2 Data Model
The use of diverse clouds requires the DEPSKY library to
deal with the heterogeneity of the interfaces of each cloud
provider. An aspect that is specially important is the format
of the data accepted by each cloud. The data model allow us
to ignore these details when presenting the algorithms.
Figure 2 presents the DEPSKY data model with its three
abstraction levels. In the first (left), there is the conceptual
data unit, which corresponds to the basic storage object
with which the algorithms work (a register in distributed
computing parlance [Lamport 1986, Malkhi 1998a]). A data
unit has a unique name (X in the figure), a version number
(to support updates on the object), verification data (usually
a cryptographic hash of the data) and the data stored on the
data unit object. In the second level (middle), the conceptual
data unit is implemented as a generic data unit in an abstract
storage cloud. Each generic data unit, or container, contains
two types of files: a signed metadata file and the files that
store the data. Metadata files contain the version number and
the verification data, together with other informations that
applications may demand. Notice that a data unit (conceptual
or generic) can store several versions of the data, i.e., the
container can contain several data files. The name of the
metadata file is simply metadata, while the data files are
called value<Version>, where <Version> is the version
number of the data (e.g., value1, value2, etc.). Finally, in
the third level (right) there is the data unit implementation,
i.e., the container translated into the specific constructions
supported by each cloud provider (Bucket, Folder, etc.).
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Figure 2. DEPSKY data unit and the 3 abstraction levels.
The data stored on a data unit can have arbitrary size,
and this size can be different for different versions. Each
data unit object supports the usual object store operations:
creation (create the container and the metadata file with
version 0), destruction (delete or remove access to the data
unit), write and read.
3.3 System Model
We consider an asynchronous distributed system composed
by three types of parties: writers, readers and cloud storage
providers. The latter are the clouds 1-4 in Figure 1, while
writers and readers are roles of the clients, not necessarily
different processes.
Figure 2.6: Depsky’s system architecture (taken from [12]).
To store a data item in DepSky, first the item is encrypted with a random secret key.
This key will be divided and distributed across the cloud servers with the secret sharing
scheme, which consists in distributing shares of the secret to the servers. The main
property of this scheme is that only a subset of all the shares that form the original secret
is needed to recover it. After encryption, the data item is encoded and distributed among
the servers.
The combination of these techniques ensures that no individual cloud is able to access
the unencrypted item while allowing duly authorized clients to recover the subset of
shares required to recover the original the item. However it adds an overhead of 50% the
amount of storage spaced used in each cloud when compared with the original data size.
2.2.2.4 Cuttlefish
Cuttlefish [59] is a system that ensures the confidentiality of data stored in the cloud.
It enables computations over encrypted data, leveraging both PHE and TEEs for this
purpose, by transforming submitted queries into semantically equivalent ones.
Cuttlefish also provides a set of secure data abstractions (SDTs) with corresponding
annotations. These abstractions capture restrictions on computations with respect to
confidentiality which can significantly improve performance. The SDTs provided are
sensitivity level, data range, decimal accuracy, uniqueness, tokenization, enumerated
type and composite type. Table 2.2 describes the SDTs annotations.
Figure 2.7 ilustrates the main components of this system. To improve expressiveness
and performance while reducing the amount and extent of re-encryption needed, the
Cuttlefish compiler employs the following techniques:
• Expression rewriting: expressions that are not supported by Cuttlefish’s encryption
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2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we first explain the threat model of our system
as well as provide some background on cryptographic primitives
before we present our system design.
2.1 Threat Model
Cuttlefish’s goal is to preserve data confidentiality in the presence
of an honest but curious (HbC) adversary. We assume the adversary
has access to the cloud nodes, and can observe data and computation.
Although, the adversary cannot make changes in the queries, results
or data stored in the cloud. We further assume that the system has
access to a trusted service. This service can run either on some
trusted client nodes, or on some specialized trusted hardware in
the cloud such as Intel SGX [3].
Cuttlefish achieves this goal by utilizing a set of crypto systems
to encrypt sensitive data. The security guarantees offered by each
of these crypto systems vary from strong guarantees offered by
probabilistic crypto systems, to relatively weaker guarantees such
as deterministic crypto systems which reveal duplicate values, and
order-preserving crypto systems which reveal order of values.
Despite improvements [15, 16, 19, 34, 36, 43], OPE and DET
crypto systems remain susceptible to inference attacks such as
frequency analysis attacks [30, 38]. As we discuss in subsequent
sections, Cuttlefish deals with this issue by allowing the program-
mer to assign sensitivity levels to individual data fields and guar-
anteeing that a field is never stored in the cloud unless encrypted
under a crypto system that offers the required security guarantees.
Furthermore, in Section 4.6 we explain how Cuttlefish can apply a
set of compilation techniques that can further improve the security
of queries by limiting the use of less secure crypto systems.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Each of the crypto systems used by Cuttlefish to achieve confi-
dentiality inside an untrusted cloud allows computations over en-
crypted data with respect to some operations. Table 2 summarizes
the set of crypto systems used by Cuttlefish per homomorphic prop-
erty — RND: random, DET: deterministic, OPE: order-preserving
encryption, SRCH: secure search, AHE: additive homomorphic en-
cryption, MHE: multiplicative homomorphic encryption — and the
corresponding operations they support. The operation supported
by each crypto system requires that its operands are encrypted
under the same crypto system.
In addition to this operation, some crypto systems support a
second operation (secondary homomorphic property) as long as
one of the operands is available in plaintext form (i.e., it holds no
sensitive information). For example, the Paillier crypto system is
an AHE crypto system which means its homomorphic property
supports addition between two encrypted values: there exists some
known operation ⊙ s.t. x+y = Dec(Enc(x) ⊙ Enc(y)). Furthermore,
if one of the two operands, say y, is in plaintext form, Paillier can
also perform multiplication between the two operands: there exists
some known operation ⊗ s.t. x × y = Dec(Enc(x) ⊗ y). Similarly,
the ElGamal crypto system supports multiplication between two
encrypted operands and exponentiation between an encrypted
and a plaintext operand. In Section 4.4 we discuss how intrinsic
properties of crypto systems (such as ciphertext size overhead and
Crypto system Property Operations
AES-RND RND –
FNR [21], AES-DET DET =, GROUP, JOIN
Boldyreva et al. [14] OPE <, >, ORDER, MIN
SWP [48] SRCH MATCHES pattern
Paillier [41], ASHE [42] AHE +, −, SUM
ElGamal [25] MHE ×
Table 2: Cuttlefish crypto systems and operations over en-
crypted data they support
Local query 
executor
Untrusted cloud
Trusted 
service
Encrypted
database
Local Query
Compiler
 Results
 Encrypted data 
 Encrypted 
results
Remote query
over encrypted data
 Query
 Encrypted data 
Service
provider
Trusted domain
Figure 1: Cuttlefish architecture
secondary homomorphic property) that otherwise support the same
operations, e.g., Paillier and ASHE are leveraged to reduce query
execution time.
2.3 Cuttlefish Overview
Figure 1 shows the high level architecture of Cuttlefish. Cuttlefish
ensures the confidentiality of computations of submitted queries
by transforming them into semantically equivalent queries that
operate over encrypted data. When a user submits a query, the
Cuttlefish compiler transforms it into a remote query and a local
query. The remote query which operates on encrypted data is de-
ployed on an untrusted cloud. Once the remote query completes,
the encrypted results are returned to the local query executor and
used as the input for the local query which decrypts the results of
the remote query and performs any remaining computations on
plaintext data before returning the final results to the user.
Since PHE schemes allow computations with respect to cer-
tain operations, it is possible that some parts of the query cannot
be executed in the cloud without giving away sensitive informa-
tion. To mitigate this limitation, Cuttlefish utilizes a trusted re-
encryption service that has access to the decryption keys. The
trusted re-encryption service would receive a small amount of data
to decrypt, optionally perform simple computations over the data,
encrypt the result under another crypto system and send the results
back to the cloud service, so that computation can proceed. Cut-
tlefish has two ways of realizing the trusted re-encryption service:
using hardware at the client-side or using trusted hardware (e.g.,
Intel SGX) in the cloud.
Figure 2.7: Cuttlefish’s system architecture (taken from [59]).
schemes are replaced by equivalent and suppo ted one’s. The replacement query is
also written in encryption-sensitive ways in order to reduce execution latency.
• Condition expansion: the compiler expands conditions to improve execution perfor-
mance by eliminating expensive homomorphic encryption and/or re-encryption.
• Selective encryption: fi lds that do not contain sensitive information are kept in
plaintext to reduce the overhead of operating over encrypted data.
• Efficient encryption: when one field is involved in multiple operations that can
be supported by the same homomorphic encryption scheme, Cuttlefish selects the
homomorphic encryption scheme that allows for a mor fficient execution.
Table 2.2: Cuttlefish SDTs annotations (taken and adapted from [59]).
Annotation Description
+ | - Positive or negative numeric values
range(x-y) Values from x to y
accuracy(x) x decimal points preserved
unique No duplicate values
delimiter(char) Tokens separated by char
enum(v1, v2, ...) Enumerated values
composite Composite values
When a user submits a query, first the compiler transforms it into a remote and local
query. The remote query, which operates over encrypted data, is issued to the untrusted
cloud. Upon the remote query completion, the encrypted results are returned to the local
query executer. These results are used as the local query executor input which decrypts
them and performs any remaining computations on the plaintext data before returning
the final results to the user.
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When a query cannot be executed in the cloud without leaking information, the
trusted re-encryption service that as access to the decryption keys is used. If need be,
some transformations are also performed on the data before re-encryption with a dif-
ferent scheme occurs. Afterwards, the re-encrypted data is returned to the untrusted
cloud so that the remote query can be completed. This service can be implemented using
hardware at the client-side or using trusted hardware, namelly Intel SGX, in the cloud.
2.2.3 Critical Analysis
Although cryptographic schemes enable operations to be done over ciphertext, these
schemes leak information about the performed operations (as is the case of SSE) and
they either have a big performance overhead which renders them unusable or only allow
limited operations to be performed (homomorphic encryption).
In the case of SSE, the information that is leaked mainly comprises access and search
patterns [25, 39]. Access patterns reveal which documents contain the queried keyword,
even though the adversary never learns the keyword in plaintext. This can be enough to
disclose sensitive information about the original data, given some prior knowledge about
it. This type of information leakage has been proved impossible to stop by Muhammad
Naveed [45]. A search pattern allows to identify whether any two queries are generated
from the same keyword or not. In [39], the authors present a scheme which hides the
search patterns that is based on a grouping-based construction to transform the underly-
ing SSE scheme into a new one.
As for the cryptographic systems discussed, both CryptDB and Cipherbase rely on
homomorphic encryption, which incurs in an overhead that is only acceptable when
the data set is medium-sized [49], and other deterministic cryptographic schemes that
leak information in the same fashion as discussed above. Due to using specific trusted
hardware that might improve the performance overhead, Cipherbase also suffers from
portability issues. Cuttlefish doesn’t suffer from this issue, despite also relying on trusted
hardware (Intel’s SGX), because it alternatively allows computations to be performed over
encryption schemes such as the ones used by CryptDB and Cipherbase. Nonetheless, by
allowing computations to be performed through encryption schemes or trusted hardware,
Cuttlefish suffers from the vulnerabilities of both solutions. Lastly, DepSky is purely a
storage solution that doesn’t support SSE, thus reducing its practicality.
2.3 Data Stores and Models
In this section we will focus on Not Only SQL (NoSQL) stores, discussing their data mod-
els and briefly highlighting some of the most prominent solutions under each category
by summarizing their characteristics focusing on their security properties.
We particularly focus on Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDT’s) as they can be
used as the underlying representation of the data stored in NoSQL stores, a possibility
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we intend to explore in this thesis.
2.3.1 NoSQL Models and Stores
Analogous as to what is the definition of NoSQL, the classification concerning the NoSQL
data models is not agreed upon. We will adopt the classification and terminology defined
by Hetch et. al. [33]. Accordingly there are four main categories — key-value, column-
family, document and graph.
2.3.1.1 Key-Value Stores
Key-value stores resemble map or dictionaries. The data is stored in key-value pairs
< k,v >, where k uniquely identifies v thus allowing to retrieve it or store it. Key-value
stores provide a schema-free data model as the value is completely opaque to the data
store which means it can hold arbitrary data. This characteristic has the following conse-
quences:
• Key-value stores are not suitable when relations and/or structure is required of the
data. These requirements must be met with the necessary logic at the client side
application;
• They do not support data-level querying nor indexing. Queries are enabled only
through the keys.
Additionally, key-value stores can also be classified as in-memory, which keep the
data mainly in memory, or as persistent, which keep the data on disk [32]. In spite of
keeping the data mainly in memory, this doesn’t mean that in-memory key value stores
aren’t not persistent as data can be periodically backed up into the disk.
Redis [53] and Riak [54] are examples of such stores.
Redis Redis is an in memory key-value store that allows backups of the data to be
made to the disk. It uses asynchronous replication of data, although it is possible to
configure synchronous replication, and provides eventual consistency. It offers some
data structures such as lists, hashes and sets to store data 1. Redis is designed to be
accessed by trusted clients inside trusted environments and as such doesn’t provide many
security capabilities. Nonetheless, a weak form of authentication can be configured by
having Redis only accept connections from clients who provide a correct password which
is set by the administrator in plain text in the Redis configuration files. The security
of the connection is left to the client and the selection of a suitable password is of the
responsibility of the administrator.
1Some of these data structures allow for more refined queries due to secondary indexes, which makes the
classification of Redis rather ambiguous as, although claimed to be a key-value store, one can also classify it
as a document store.
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Riak Riak is a persistent key-value store which uses as asynchronous replication and it
can provide eventual or strong consistency. It offers data structures with built-in conflict
detection and resolution such as counters, sets and maps which essentially are CRDTs.
Unlike Redis, it provides some authorization and authentication mechanisms, like access
control and password based authentication, as well as secure communication channels in
client-to-server communication.
2.3.1.2 Document Stores
In document stores, such as MongoDB [70], the data is stored in key-document pairs
< k,doc >, where k uniquely identifies documents within the store. In this sense, doc-
ument stores are similar to key-value stores. The documents support more complex
data including secondary indexes within a document, different schemas of documents in
the store, nested documents or lists. As such document stores support data-level query
and indexing but, like key-value stores, they do not support relations among documents
which makes them unsuitable for these scenarios.
MongoDB MongoDB is a document store which uses as asynchronous replication and
it can provide eventual or strong consistency. Unlike the solutions discussed so far, Mon-
goDB offers more extensive security mechanisms [44] thus being quite comparable to
relational databases in this regard. It offers mechanisms for authentication, authoriza-
tion, client-to-server and server-to-server secure communication channels for free while
the mechanisms for auditing and encryption of the stored data are only available on its
enterprise edition.
2.3.1.3 Column-family Stores
In these types of stores, data is stored in a column-oriented way, therefore one can think
of them as tables. Column-stores, e.g. Cassandra [5], follow the guidelines of the data
model used in Google’s BigTable [17], where the table is analogous to a sparse, distributed,
persistent multidimensional sorted map.
A data item is represented by a row, which possesses one or more different columns
that in turn can belong to different column families. Each row and column family are
uniquely identified by a key, thus allowing more complex queries and indexing. Nonethe-
less, if the relationships among data are required, they must still be provided by the client
application.
Column-stores resemble relational databases when it comes to their representation,
but they differ when null values must be handled. Where relational databases would
store a null value for each column where no value was provided for, a column family
store will only insert a null value in a row for a column if it is required to do so. In other
words, homogeneity within a dataset is not enforced thus data items may not have certain
attributes specified at all.
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Cassandra Cassandra is a column-family store, where instead of rows there is partitions,
that uses asynchronous replication and which can provide eventual or strong consistency.
It offers its own query language, the Cassandra Query Language (CQL), which supports
a rich set data types. It offers security mechanisms for authentication, authorization,
client-to-server and server-to-server secure communication channels.
2.3.1.4 Graph Stores
In contrast to the previously discussed stores, graph stores such as Neo4j [46] are special-
ized on efficient management of highly correlated data. They rely on graph theory and as
their data model they use a graph which is a set of nodes and the links that connect them.
In these stores the nodes and links have properties, respectively, which are represented
by key-value pairs.
Due to be specialized for correlated data, these stores do not scale very well because
of the overhead imposed by traversing the relations across nodes in different servers.
Neo4j Neo4j is graph store which uses asynchronous replication and it can provide even-
tual or strong consistency. It offers its own query language, the Cypher Query Language
(Cypher), which supports queries through pattern matching of nodes and relationships in
the graph. It offers security mechanisms for authentication, authorization, client-to-server
and server-to-server secure communication channels. Additionally, it offers facilities to
provide mechanisms for auditing through logs.
2.3.1.5 Critical Analysis
Although they were designed to manage massive amounts of data, the characteristics of
these stores must be taken into consideration when choosing which one to use.
Key-value, document and column family gained advantages in distribution by denor-
malizing the stored data. However, if relationships among data is required, they must
be implemented at the client side application which increases its code complexity and
it may provoke performance penalties due to the amount of queries that may be neces-
sary. In these situations, graph stores are more suitable. Another important aspect is the
amount of expressiveness allowed in queries, even when relationship among data is not
required. Typically, key-value stores only have basic operations (i.e. get, put, remove).
Document and column-family stores extend these basic operations by allowing range
queries, "in"and "and/or". Graph stores are the most expressive as they enable queries
to be made using different query languages which leverage different techniques such as
pattern matching and graph transversal [33].
Overall, NoSQL data stores have the following issues [32]:
• Low level query languages. As previously discussed, NoSQL don’t offer rich queries
capabilities;
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• Lack of standardization of APIs. The offered APIs are specific to each store, which
makes scenarios where more that one NoSQL store could be combined to offer the
best solution difficult to achieve;
• Limited security measures. When compared to relational databases, NoSQL stores
offer limited security measures. Relational databases typically offer mechanisms
for authentication, authorization, auditing and several levels of encryption such
as encryption of the data that is stored on the disks (data at rest), client-to-server
communication and server-to-server connection encryption. NoSQL usually only
offer a subset of these mechanisms.
2.3.2 Conflict-free Replicated Data Types
A Conflict-free Replicated Data Type (CRDT) [64] is a data abstraction which provides
guarantees of safety, liveness and convergence to a correct common state upon replication
in a self-stablising manner without need for synchronization, despite any number of fail-
ures. To ensure absence of conflict, simple mathematical properties such as monotonicity
in a semi-lattice and/or commutativity are leveraged.
Replication of CRDT objects is done under Strong Eventual Consistency (SEC). An
object is strongly eventually consistent if it is eventually consistent, i.e. all replicas reach
the same final value if clients stop submitting updates, and if correct replicas that have
delivered the same updates have equivalent state.
The system where the replication of CRDTs occurs, is assumed to have the following
properties:
• There is a finite setΠ = p0, ...,pn−1 of non-byzantine processes;
• Processes inΠmay crash silently; a crashed process may remain crashed forever, or
may recover with its memory intact. A non-crashed process is said correct;
• The processes of the system are interconnected by an asynchronous network;
• The network can partition and recover.
Similarly to other objects, CRDTs allow for state-based or operation-based replication.
As such, they may be specified with respect to both.
State-based object An state based object is a tuple (S,s0,q,u,m). The replica at process
pi has state si ∈ S, called its payload; the initial state is s0. A client of the object may read
the state of the object via query method q and modify it via update method u. Method m
serves to merge the state from a remote replica. Any method executes at a single replica.
A method whose precondition is satisfied is said enabled and executes as soon as it is
invoked.
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Every replica occasionally sends its local state to some other replica, which merges
the state thus received into its own state. In this way, every update eventually reaches
every replica, either directly or indirectly.
Under the assumption of eventual delivery and termination, a state-based object is
said to be strongly eventually consistent if it also is a monotonic semilattice object. A
monotonic semilattice object is a state-based object equipped with a partial order ≤, thus
noted as (S,≤, s0,q,u,m), with the following properties:
1. The set S of payload values forms a join semilattice ordered by ≤ . A join semilattice
is a partially ordered set that has a least upper bound for any nonempty finite subset.
In other words, it has an element s which is the least element that is greater than or
equal to all elements of S;
2. Merging sate s with remote state s′ computes the least upper bound of the two state;
3. The state is monotonically non-decreasing across updates.
Operation-based object An op-based object is a tuple (S,s0,q, t,u,P ), where S, s0 and
q have the same meaning as in a state-based object. An op-based object has no merge
method. As such, an update is split into a pair (t,u), where t is a side-effect-free prepare-
update method and u is an effect-update method.
The prepare-update executes at the single replica where the operation is invoked (its
source). At the source, prepare-update method t is followed immediately by effect-update
method u. The effect-update method executes at all replicas (said downstream). The
source replica delivers the effect-update to downstream replicas using a communication
protocol specified by the delivery relation P .
Under the assumption of causal delivery of updates and method termination, an op-
based object that satisfies the commutativity property for all concurrent updates, and
whose delivery precondition is satisfied by causal delivery is said to be strongly eventually
consistent.The commutativity property is defined as follows. Updates (t,u) and (t′ ,u′)
commute if and only if for any reachable state s where both u and u′ are enabled:
1. u and u′ remain enabled in states s •u′ and s •u, respectively;
2. s •u •u′ ≡ s •u′ •u 2.
2.4 Summary
With our research we conclude that although there are solutions that follow a somewhat
similar approach to the one we intend to pursuit, like CryptDB [51] and Cipherbase [6]
by storing and computing on encrypted data and Cuttlefish [59] by offering secure data
2In this context two states s and s′ are said to be equivalent, s ≡ s′ , if all queries return the same result
for s and s′ . Note that a query has no side-effects which means (s • q) ≡ s.
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types, there is still room for improvement and to explore new paths to build secure cloud
and distributed computing solutions.
Computing over encrypted data, using mechanisms like homomorphic and search-
able encryption schemes, allows to mitigate data privacy issues in the cloud and other
distributed computing environments. For its practical use, factors like the operation’s
performance requirements and the implications of the data information leakage for the
cloud base application must be taken into consideration. Fully Homomorphic encryption
remains unpractical due to its performance overhead yet partial and somewhat homo-
morphic achieve better performance at the cost of limiting the type and the number of
operations allowed. Searchable symmetric encryption reduces the performance overhead
by revealing information about the queried data.
NoSQL data stores are highly available and perform well in distributed systems such
as the cloud. In an approach similar to the Riak [54] store and its data structures, our
goal is to design secure CRDTs (SCRDTs) libraries that may be incorporated into a NoSQL
data store in order to provide security guarantees over it. The CRDTs can easily be stored
under any of the discussed data models and in the case of key-value stores, they may
increase query expressiveness if the operations they support are exposed by the data
store API.
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Solution Design
As previously mentioned, with this thesis we aim at developing a set of secure abstrac-
tions, specifically secure CRDTs or SCRDTs, to support secure computations in the con-
text of NoSQL data stores hosted by cloud services and to serve as a tool for programmers
to develop their own distributed applications. In this context, secure means that the data
stored in these abstractions are confidentiality and privacy protected. The SCRDTs we
designed were implemented with the support of different cryptographic algorithms to
provide the intend security.
In this chapter, Section 3.1 provides an overview of the architecture of the system
where the SCRDTs are intended to be used, which is a cloud-backed NoSQL distributed
data store, and Section 3.2 defines our threat model. Finally, Section 3.3 describes and
discusses all of the CRDTs and correspondent SCRDTs developed within this thesis.
3.1 System Architecture
Figure 3.1 illustrates the architecture of an NoSQL distributed data store where the
SCRDTs would be integrated in. This store uses the key-value data model where the
keys map to the SCRDTs we developed, it is in memory and exports get, put and remove
operations. Each node of the system represents different instances, i.e. replicas, of the
store service running in the cloud which may or may not be located within the same data
center.
Each node is composed by the following components: Storage, Client Interface and
Replication Mechanism.
The Storage component is where data is effectively stored in one of our SCRDT data
structures, which in turn are stored under the key value data model. In other words,
the storage component maps to the memory of the machine where the service replica is
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running.
The Client Interface exports the API necessary to manipulate the data in the storage
component. Although the data store model is of the type key value which typically only
supports an limited amount of operations (e.g.: put, get and remove operations), through
the use of our Stubs component which provides direct support of all of the operations of
each CRDT and SCRDT it is possible to achieve a more expressive API.
The Replication Mechanism is responsible for replicating operations and merging the
state of the stored SCRDTs with the state of other replicas in order to ensure their conver-
gence.
The manipulation of the data on the client side is mediated by the Stubs component.
For each of the structures we designed there is an corresponding Stub that is made avail-
able on the client side. This stub is responsible for:
• Exporting the operations supported by its corresponding CRDT and SCRDT ab-
stractions to the client;
• Applying the operations of its corresponding CRDT and SCRDT abstractions and
propagating their result to the data store service replica through the use of the get,
put and remove operations exported by the data store;
• Encrypting and decrypting data under the appropriate encryption schemes in the
case of manipulation of SCRDTs.
Figure 3.2 shows a sequence diagram of an use case of how the Stub component
intervenes when a client of the system invokes the add operation of an element e over an
set identified by the key S in the data store. The encryption scheme to be used is chosen
based on the following factors:
1. the invoked operation;
2. the selected structure.
It follows that this component is also responsible for managing the required crypto-
graphic keys that must be supplied by the client. If data is shared among clients, it is
assumed that a key sharing protocol was made a priori.
Communication among replicas of the service and between clients and replicas of the
service, signalled by (1) and (2) in Figure 3.1 respectively, are assumed to be made over
secure communications channels such as a TLS channel.
3.2 Threat Model
As we aim the data store system is suported by cloud services, our threat model is com-
prised by a cloud administrator adversary of the type Honest but Curious (HbC) [19].
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Figure 3.1: System model diagram.
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Figure 3.2: Use case of an Stub component In this example, a client wishes to add an
element e to an set identified by key S in the data store.
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This administrator has access to the cloud provider’s infrastructure and software plat-
forms which consequently provides him access to customer data. The administrator main
goal isn’t to corrupt the computations but to gather as much information about them as
possible in order to infer their nature.
We do not consider external attacks to the communication channels over the inter-
net (signalled by (1) and (2) in Figure 3.1) in our threat model as we assume that all
communications are made through the use of secure communication channels such as a
TLS channel. External in this context refers to the fact that the attacks are performed by
adversaries external to the cloud provider’s infrastructure.
3.3 Data Structures
To develop our solution, firstly we studied and then selected which of the existent CRDTs
in the literature [52, 63] were the most relevant and important to provide support to data
stores and web applications. These where registers, sets, lists, maps and counters. Regard-
ing the replication method and concurrency conflict resolution polices of the structures,
we opted for state based replication to follow a similar approach as current industry solu-
tions like Riak [54], and the following policies as they are the most common ones and are
valuable in different use case scenarios:
1. Add Wins: given two concurrent update operations of adding and removing an
element to the structure, the add operation persists.
2. Last Writer Wins: given an total order relationship over the update operations, the
update that persists is the one issued by the last writer.
Table 3.1 maps each of the selected data structures in each of the policies.
As our goal was to build secure versions of CRDTs, the SCRDTs, by supporting all
of their operations with the aid of cryptographic algorithms, we analysed which of these
algorithms enabled to support said operations with the maximum security possible for
each of the selected CRDTs. Table 3.2 resumes the results of this analysis.
In the following sections a detailed description and specification of each of the CRDT
data structures is provided along with the methodology used in selecting which crypto-
graphic algorithms will support their respective SCRDT version. The main difference
between SCRDTs and CRDTs is that the former stores encrypted data while the latter
stores non encrypted data, thus no specification is provided for the SCRDTs as it would
be the same as its correspondent CRDT. Finally, Section 3.3.6 provides a critical analysis
regarding the security of the SCRDTs developed.
3.3.1 Set
The set structure behaves just like an mathematical set, i.e. it is a collection of distinct
elements. For this structure, we developed three variants — grow only, last writer wins
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Table 3.1: Mapping of CRDTs and conflict resolution policies.
CRDT Conflict Resolution Policies
Set Last Writter Wins, Add Wins
List Last Writter Wins, Add Wins
Map Last Writter Wins, Add Wins
Register Last Writter Wins
Counter Non Aplicable
Table 3.2: Mapping of CRDTs and cryptographic algorithms.
CRDT Cryptographic Algorithm
Set Deterministic Encryption
List Deterministic Encryption
Map Deterministic and Probabilistic Encryption
Register Probabilistic Encryption
Counter Partial Homomorphic Encryption
and add wins set —that have the following operations:
1. Add: inserts an element in the set;
2. Remove: removes an element from the set;
3. Contains: checks if a given element belongs to the set;
4. Size: returns the number of elements of the set;
5. Getall: returns all the elements within the set.
Operations 1 and 2 are categorized as updates as they modify the structure and the
rest of the operations are categorized as queries. Next we detail three variants of the set
CRDT that we developed.
Grow Only Set (G-Set) The grow only set (Algorithm 1), is an exception within the
developed sets as it only one update operation, the add operation. This property alongside
the uniqueness property of the elements within a set results in the impossibility to have
concurrency conflicts regarding the add operation. Despite being quite simple, this set
is an important pillar stone to build other CRDTs that are more complex. The state of an
G-Set is represented by a set S of elements e. The contains operation simply tests if an
element e belongs to the state S and the merge of two G-Sets consists in the union of their
respective states.
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Last Writer Wins Set (LWW-Set) The last writer wins set (Algorithm 2) is similar to
the specification given by Shapiro et. al. [63]. As in this set there are two update opera-
tions that might lead to a concurrency conflict, there is a need for an conflict resolution
policy. In this case, the policy is the Last Writer Wins. To enforce this policy additional
information, namely a time stamp ts, is kept alongside the elements within the state of
the LWW-Set.
To support the remove operation, the state of the set is represented by two distinct
G-Sets, sets A and R. Whenever an element e is added, or removed, to the LWW-Set at an
instant ts, the pair (e, ts) is inserted in A, or R. An element e is said to be contained in set
if:
1. (e,_) ∈ A∧ (e,_) < R, or
2. (e, ts) ∈ A∧ (e, ts′) ∈ R∧ ts > ts′.
As the state of an LWW-Set is represented by two G-Sets, the merge operation between
two LWW-Sets consists in merging the G-Sets that represent their state.
Add Wins Set The add wins set (Algorithms 3 and 4), also known as observed-removed
set [63], also allows the remove operation. However in this set this operation is supported
through the use of time stamps ts and unique identifiers id which are associated to each
of its elements within its state and, as indicated by the name, the concurrency conflict
resolution policy is Add Wins. Additionally and to enforce the Add Wins policy, a flag
type is also kept to indicate which was the last operation made over the element.
The state representation of an Add Wins Set is a map of associations of type id →
(e, ts, type). Whenever an element e is added to this set at an instant ts, an unique iden-
tifier id is generated and an association id → (e, ts, type) is inserted in the state. As a
consequence, we have that an element may be added multiple times to the set.
Whenever an element e is removed at an instant ts, all of the associations id →
(e, ts′ , type) in the state for which the elements match and the time stamp of the remove
operation is bigger, i.e when e = e′ ∧ ts > ts′, are marked as removed. In other words, all
of the add operations up until the instant of the remove operation are eliminated.
An element belongs to the set if there is an identifier in the state that maps to a tuple
containing this element and if the said tuple hasn’t been marked as removed. Therefore,
although an element may be added to the set under different identifiers, the element is
only visible within the set once.
Unlike the other operations of this set, the contains operation is supported through
an additional data structure. This data structure, represented by the variable mapper in
Algorithms 3 and 4, maps each of the elements of the Add Wins set in the set of all the
elements identifiers. This design choice, which trades storage space and complexity for
performance, avoids iterating over the whole state to find an entry that complies to the
condition of an element belonging to the set.
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Algorithm 1 Grow Only Set
1: function GSet( )
2: state← {}
3:
4: function Add( elem )
5: state← state ∪{elem}
6:
7: function GetAll( )
8: return state
9:
10: function Contains( elem )
11: if elem ∈ state then
12: return true
13: else
14: return false
15:
16: function Size( )
17: return #state
18:
19: function Merge( otherstate )
20: state← state ∪ otherstate
3.3.1.1 Set SCRDT and Stub
For all the described set variants there is an implicit requirement to perform equality
comparisons based on the value of an element to comply with the uniqueness property
of elements within a set. Specifically, it is a frequent necessity to verify if an element
belongs the state of the set variants.
Accordingly, to create a secure version of each of the variants it must be possible
to execute this comparison in the ciphertext. For this purpose, we leveraged property
preserving encryption algorithms to build the said version. In particular, we used deter-
ministic encryption to cipher each of the elements that belong to the sets. Algorithm 5
shows the pseudocode for the stub of all of the set’s SCRDTs.
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Algorithm 2 Last Writer Wins Set
1: function LWWSet( )
2: addSet← GSet()
3: removeSet← GSet()
4:
5: function Add( elem, ts )
6: addSet[elem]← ts
7:
8: function Remove( elem, ts)
9: removeSet[elem]← ts
10:
11: function Cointains( elem )
12: if elem ∈ Filtered() then
13: return true
14: else
15: return false
16:
17: function GetAll( )
18: return Filtered()
19:
20: function Size( )
21: return #Filtered()
22:
23: function Merge( otherAddSet, otherRemoveSet )
24: addSet.merge( otherAddSet )
25: removeSet.merge( otherRemoveSet )
26:
27: function Filtered( ) . Auxiliar method
28: r← {}
29: for (elem,ts) ∈ addSet do
30: if (elem,_) < removeSet then
31: r← r ∪{elem}
32: else
33: (elem’, ts’)← (e,t) ∈ removeSet ∧ elem’ = elem
34: if ts > ts′ then
35: r← r ∪{elem′}
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Algorithm 3 Add Wins Set - Part I
1: function AddWinsSet( )
2: elemns← {} . The actual state representation
3: mapper← {} . Map of elements and the id’s associated with them
4:
5: function Add( id, elem, ts )
6: if elemns[id] =⊥ then . An id we have yet to observe
7: elemns[id]← (elem, ts, 1)
8: if mapper[elem] ,⊥ then
9: mapper[elem]←mapper[elem] ∪{id}
10: else
11: mapper[elem]←{id}
12: else . An id we have observed
13: (elem’, ts’, _ )← elemns[id]
14: if elem′ = elem∧ ts′ ≤ ts then . Checking if it’s associated with this element
15: elemns[id]← (elem, ts, 1)
16:
17: function Remove( elem, ts)
18: idSet←mapper[elem]
19: if idSet ,⊥ then
20: for all id ∈ idSet do
21: (_, ts’, _ )← elemns[id]
22: if ts′ < ts then
23: elemns[id]← (elem, ts, 0)
24:
25: function Cointains( elem )
26: idSet←mapper[elem]
27: if idSet ,⊥ then
28: for all id ∈ idSet do
29: ( _ ,_ , type )← elemns[id]
30: if type = 1 then
31: return true
32: return false
33:
34: function GetAll( )
35: r← {}
36: for all (_, elem,_, type) ∈ elemns do
37: if type , 0∧ elem < r then
38: r← r ∪{elem}
39: return r
40:
41: function Size( )
42: return #GetAll()
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Algorithm 4 Add Wins Set - Part II
1: function Merge( otherState )
2: for (id,elem,ts, type) ∈ otherState do
3: if type = 1 then
4: Add(id,elem, ts)
5: else if type = 0 then
6: Remove (id,elem, ts)
Algorithm 5 Set Stub
1: function SetStub( store, pwd, iv )
2: Kd ← loadKey(store, pwd);
3: IV ← iv;
4: service← getServiceEndpoint();
5:
6: function Add( Key, elem )
7: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
8: service.setAdd(Key, elem’)
9:
10: function Remove( Key, elem ) . This operation is non applicable for the G-Set
11: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
12: service.setRemove(Key, elem’)
13:
14: function Contains( Key, elem )
15: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
16: return service.setContains(Key, elem’)
17:
18: function GetAll( Key )
19: encState← service.setGetAll(Key)
20: state←{}
21: for e ∈ encState do
22: e’← detDec(Kd , IV , e)
23: state← state ∪{e′}
24: return state
25:
26: function Size( Key )
27: return service.setSize(Key)
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3.3.2 List
The list structure behaves like an mathematical sequence, i.e it is an collection of elements
that allows for repetitions and which is enumerated. The list CRDT we developed is built
upon a modified version of the CRDT TreeDoc proposed by Preguiça et. al. [52] and has
the following operations:
1. Insert: inserts an element in the specified position of the list;
2. Remove: removes an element in the specified position from the list;
3. Contains: checks if a given element belongs to the list;
4. Get: returns the element stored in the list in the specified position;
5. Size: returns the number of elements of the list;
6. Getall: returns all the elements within the list.
Operations 1 and 2 are categorized as updates as they modify the structure and the
rest of the operations are categorized as queries. Most of these operations are supported
through the use of indexes which in a distributed environment, where there is different
copies of the list that must present an unique and consistent order of its elements, might
lead to a problem if distinct elements are concurrently inserted in the same position
in distinct copies of the list. In such scenario, upon merging these distinct copies it is
impossible to deterministically order these insertions using only the index in order to
compute the final and correct state for both lists. The TreeDoc CRDT addresses this
concern.
Originally, TreeDoc consists in a sequential shared buffer where each entry of the
vector is associated with an identifier P osId with the following properties:
1. Every element in the buffer has identifier;
2. There is a total order of the identifiers, represented by < that is consistent with the
order of the elements within the buffer.
3. Given any identifiers id1 e id2, it is always possible to define a new identifier id3
between id1 e id2.
These properties are required to ensure that concurrent updates commute thus en-
suring convergence of replicas. The identifier P osId consists in the pair (p,d) where p is
the position the element was intended to be inserted in and d is an disambiguator. The
purpose of this disambiguator is to enable to establish a total order among elements that
were inserted in the same position. It follows that the state representation of the TreeDoc
is an ordered list of (P osId,e) .
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In our list (Algorithms 6 and 7) take leverage the identifiers, where the disambiguator
is of the type simple disambiguator (SDIS) [52], and we associate them to the element
plus some metadata, namely a time stamp ts and the type type of the update operation
that was last performed, similarly to our approach in the Add Wins Set, to help enforce
conflict resolution policies. Thus the state of our list is represented by a map of entries of
the type P osId→ (e, ts, type).
We also maintain two additional data structures to help support the list’s operations
— atoms and ids. The ids structure is an array that in each entry i contains the identifier
P osId of the element that is currently at that position in the lists and it only contains the
identifiers of the elements that effectively are in the list. The atoms structure is a map
of P osId → e entries that maps all of the identifiers of the elements that effectively are
in the list in their elements. These structures allow for better performance of the list’s
query operations (getAll, get, contains) and the remove operation at a cost of using more
memory.
We implemented two variants of the list: add wins and last writer wins. As their
behaviour is similar except for the remove operation, the main algorithm for the list is
shown in Algorithms 6 and 7 whereas the remove operations of the last writer wins and
add wins variants is shown in Algorithms 8 and 9, respectively.
Last Writer Wins List (LWW-List) The Last Writer Wins list, as the name indicates,
applies the last writer wins concurrency conflict resolution policy. Whenever an element
e is inserted in the list at position i at instant ts, an identifier P osId = (i,d) is generated
where the disambiguator d will take a value that is between the disambiguators of the
identifiers in positions i − 1 and i + 1 of the list. After creating the identifier, an entry
P osId→ (e, ts, type) is inserted in the state, a pair (P osId,e) is inserted in atoms and P osId
is inserted in ids.
Whenever a remove is issued for position i in the instant ts, the element to be removed
is selected based on the identifier that is in the position i in ids structure. Afterwards,
if the time stamp ts′ of the last operation associated with this element is bigger or equal
than ts, the element is marked as removed and the auxiliary data structures atoms and
ids are invalidated so that they may be recomputed again. An element is said to be in the
list if it is present in the atoms structure. The merge operation consists in the union of
the state of the two lists, where for the elements stored in the same position the process
described for the insert operation is used.
Add Wins List The Add Wins list, again as the name indicates, applies the add wins
concurrency conflict resolution policy and behaves like the LWW-List in every operation
except the remove. In this list, whenever a remove is issued for position i in the instant
ts, the element to be removed is selected based on the identifier that is at position i in
ids. Afterwards if the time stamp ts′ of the last operation associated with this element is
strictly bigger than ts, the element is marked as removed and the auxiliary data structures
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atoms and ids are also invalidated. If the time stamps ts and ts′ are equal then the
element is only marked as removed if the type type of the last operation associated with
the element is not an insertion.
3.3.2.1 List SCRDT and Stub
Despite the majority of the operations of the list being supported through indexes, the
contains operation is based upon the value of the element. Consequently, for the list there
is a requirement to be able to perform equality comparisons, as with the set. Specifically,
in this structure it is necessary to verify if the element belongs to the atoms auxiliary
structure.
Accordingly, the secure versions of the list’s variants store their elements under a
deterministic encryption scheme. Algorithm 10 shows the pseudocode for the stub of all
of the list’s SCRDTs.
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Algorithm 6 List - Part I
1: function List( )
2: state← {}
3: atoms← {} . Ordered map of position id’s and elements
4: ids← {} . Ordered set of id’s
5:
6: function Insert( elem, ts )
7: Insert( Size(), elem, ts )
8:
9: function Insert( i, elem, ts )
10: id← CreatePosition( i ) . Creates an composite identifier
11: if state[id] ,⊥ then
12: (elem, ts’, type)← state[id]
13: if ts ≥ ts′ then
14: state[id]← (elem, ts, 1) . Inserts are operation type 1
15: atoms← atoms ∪{ (id, elem) }
16: ids← ids ∪{ id }
17: else
18: state[id]← (elem, ts, 1)
19: atoms← atoms ∪{ (id, elem) }
20: ids← ids ∪{ id }
21:
22: function Remove( ts )
23: return Remove( Size()-1, ts ) . See algorithms 8 and 9
24:
25: function Get( i )
26: idArray← GetIdsArray() . Computes and returns all of the ids
27: atoms← GetAtoms() . Computes and returns all of the atoms
28: id← idArray[i]
29: elem← atoms[id]
30: return elem
31:
32: function Cointains( elem )
33: atomsMap← GetAtoms()
34: for all (id,elem′) ∈ atomsMap do
35: if elem = elem′ then
36: return true
37: return false
38:
39: function GetAll( )
40: atomsMap← GetAtoms()
41: r← {}
42: for all (id,elem) ∈ atomsMap do
43: r← r ∪{elem}
44: return r
45:
46: function Size( )
47: return #GetAtoms()
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Algorithm 7 List - Part II
1: function Merge( otherState )
2: for all (id,elem,ts′ , type) ∈ otherState do
3: i← id.GetPosition()
4: if type = 1 then
5: Insert(i, elem, ts)
6: else if type = 0 then
7: Remove(i, elem, ts)
Algorithm 8 Last Writer Wins
1: function Remove( i, ts )
2: idArray← GetIdsArray()
3: id← idArray[i]
4: if state[id] ,⊥ then
5: (elem, ts’, type)← state[id]
6: if ts ≥ ts′ then
7: state[id]← (⊥, ts, 0) . Removes are operation type 0
8: atomsArray← getAtoms()
9: elem← atomsArray[id]
10: Delinearize() . Invalidates the atoms and id’s structures
11: return elem
12: return ⊥
Algorithm 9 Add Wins List
1: function Remove( i, ts )
2: id← GetIdsArray().get( i )
3: if state[id] ,⊥ then
4: (elem, ts’, type)← state[id]
5: if ts > ts′ ∨ (ts′ = ts∧ type , 1) then
6: state[id]← (⊥, ts, 0) . Removes are operation type 0
7: atomsArray← getAtoms()
8: elem← atomsArray[id]
9: Delinearize() . Invalidates the atoms and id’s structures
10: return elem
11: else
12: state[id]← (⊥, ts, 0)
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Algorithm 10 List Stub
1: function ListStub( store, pwd, iv )
2: Kd ← loadKey(store, pwd);
3: IV ← iv;
4: service← getServiceEndpoint();
5:
6: function Add( Key, elem)
7: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
8: service.listInsert(Key, elem’)
9:
10: function Add( Key, i , elem)
11: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
12: service.listInsert(Key, i, elem’)
13:
14: function Remove( Key )
15: service.listRemove(Key )
16:
17: function Remove( Key, i )
18: service.listRemove(Key, i)
19:
20: function Contains( Key, elem )
21: elem’← detEnc(Kd , IV , elem)
22: return service.listContains(Key, elem’)
23:
24: function Get( Key, i )
25: elem← service.listGet(key, i)
26: if elem ,⊥ then
27: return detDec(Kd , IV , elem)
28: return ⊥
29:
30: function GetAll( Key )
31: encState← service.listGetAll(key)
32: state← {}
33: for e ∈ encState do
34: e’← detDec(Kd , IV , e)
35: state← state ∪{e′}
36: return state
37:
38: function Size( Key )
39: return service.listSize(Key)
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3.3.3 Register
A register behaves like a container for some arbitrary value which can be updated at any
given time. The register CRDT implemented (Algorithm 11) is similar to the specification
given by Shapiro et. al. [63], which enforces the last writer wins conflict policy and has
the following operations:
1. Put: updates the value stored in the register;
2. Get: returns the value stored in the register;
Operation 1 is categorized as an update as it modifies the structure’s state and opera-
tion 2 is categorized as a query.
The register CRDT stores a time stamp ts, besides arbitrary value v, that indicates
when the last update to the value was made thus its state is represented by the pair
(v, ts). A put operation of value v′ issued on the instant ts′ consists in updating the value
stored within the register if the time stamp ts is greater or equal the current time stamp
stored in the register, i.e it verifies if ts ≥ ts′. The get operation is very straightforward
and simply returns the current value of the register. The merge operation between two
registers determines which of the values should persist by applying the same logic of the
put operation.
Algorithm 11 Last Writer Wins Register
1: function LWWRegister( )
2: state← (⊥,⊥)
3:
4: function Put( val, ts )
5: ( val’, ts’)← state
6: if ts ≥ ts′ then
7: state← (val, ts)
8:
9: function Get( )
10: (val, ts )← state
11: return val
12:
13: function Merge( otherstate )
14: (val, ts)← state
15: (val’, ts’)← otherstate
16: if ts′ ≥ ts then
17: state← (val’, ts’)
3.3.3.1 Register SCRDT and Stub
As none of the register operations is made through the value there are no requirements
over it, thus the secure version of the register stores the value under a probabilistic
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encryption scheme. Algorithm 12 shows the pseudocode for the stub of the register
SCRDT.
Algorithm 12 Register Stub
1: function RegisterStub( store, pwd, iv )
2: Kr ← loadKey(store, pwd);
3: IV← iv;
4: service← getServiceEndpoint();
5:
6: function Put( Key, v )
7: v’← rndEnc(Kr , IV , v)
8: service.registerPut(Key, v’)
9:
10: function Get( Key )
11: v← service.registerGet(Key)
12: if v ,⊥ then
13: return rndDec(Kr , IV , v)
14: return ⊥
3.3.4 Map
A map is a collection of (key, value) pairs where the key must be unique within the
collection. The map CRDT has the following operations:
1. Put: inserts a key value entry in the map;
2. Remove: removes the entry mapped by the given key from the map;
3. Contains: checks if there is an entry mapped by the given key;
4. Get: returns the value in the entry that is mapped by the given key;
5. Size: returns the number of elements of the map;
6. Getall: returns all the elements within the map.
Operations 1 and 2 are categorized as updates as they modify the structure and the
rest of the operations are categorized as queries. As with the list, for the map two variants
were developed: last writer wins and add wins map.
Last Writer Map (LWW-Map) In the last writer wins map (Algorithms 13 and 14), the
state consists in a map of entries k → rg, where rg is a register CRDT which enforces
the last writer wins policy and is detailed in Section 3.3.3. This composition of CRDTs
enables to simplify the logic required to both enforce the conflict policy and to perform
the merge operation.
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The put operation of a pair (k,v) at an instant ts consists in inserting the entry k→ rg
in the state. The remove operation of a value v associated with a key k at an instant ts
consists in inserting the null value in the register rg associated with the key k so that
this entry is marked as removed. A key k is said to be in the map if there is an entry for
that key in the state and if the value stored in the register associated with this key is not
null. The merge operation between two LWW-Maps is the union of the two maps that
represent their state where for the keys common to both maps, the merge operation of
the associated registers is invoked.
Add Wins Map In the add wins map (Algorithms 15 and 16) the state consists in a
map of entries k→ (e, ts, type), where ts is the time stamp of the last update performed
in this entry and type indicates which was the last update made. For this map, the put
operation behaves just as described for the LWW-Map. The remove operation of a value v
associated with a key k at an instant ts consists in marking the tuple (e, ts′ , type) associated
with the key in the map’s state as removed if the time stamp of the remove operation ts is
strictly bigger to the time stamp ts′ of the last operation performed over this entry. If the
time stamps are equal, then the remove is only effective if the type of the last performed
operation isn’t a put. A key k is said to be in the map if there is an entry for that key in
the state and if its associated tuple is not marked as removed. The merge between two
Add Wins maps is the union of the two maps that represent their state, where for the keys
common to both maps the last operation performed is maintained if there are no conflicts.
If there are conflicts, the same logic used in the put operation is applied to enforce the
Add Wins policy.
3.3.4.1 Map SCRDT and Stub
For the maps, as with the sets and lists, there is also an implicit requirement to be able to
perform equality comparisons. However, in the maps the requirement is only applicable
to the key as it is used to support the majority of its operations. Therefore, the key must
be stored under a deterministic encryption scheme while the value may be stored under a
probabilistic encryption scheme as there are no requirements for it to oblige to. Algorithm
17 shows the pseudocode for the stub of all of the map’s SCRDTs.
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Algorithm 13 Last Writer Wins Map - Part I
1: function LWWMap( )
2: state← {}
3:
4: function Put( key, val, ts )
5: rg← state[key]
6: nRg← LWWRegister(val,ts)
7: if rg =⊥ then
8: state[key]← nRg
9: else
10: rg.merge( nRg )
11:
12: function Remove( key, ts )
13: rg← state[key]
14: if rg ,⊥ then
15: rg.put( ⊥ , ts )
16:
17: function Get( key )
18: rg← state[key]
19: if rg ,⊥ then
20: return rg.get()
21: else
22: return ⊥
23:
24: function Contains( key )
25: rg← state[key]
26: if rg ,⊥ then
27: return true
28: else
29: return false
3.3.5 Counter
A counter behaves like a register for some arbitrary numeric value which can be either
incremented or decremented by some value. The counter CRDT we developed is inspired
by the PN-Counter proposed by Shapiro et. al [63] which has the following operations:
1. Inc: increments the current value of the counter by some specified value;
2. Dec: decrements the current value of the counter by some specified value;
3. Get: returns current value of the counter.
Operations 1 and 2 are categorized as updates they modify the counter’s state and
operation 3 is categorized as a query.
Originally in the PN-Counter there are two vectors that represent the state, vectors P
and N , that have as many entries as the number of copies that exist of the counter. Each
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Algorithm 14 Last Writer Wins Map - Part II
1: function Size( )
2: return #Filtered()
3:
4: function GetAll( )
5: return Filtered()
6:
7: function Filtered( )
8: r← {}
9: for (key, rg) ∈ state do
10: value← rg.get()
11: if value ,⊥ then
12: r← r ∪{(key,value)}
13: return r
14:
15: function Merge( otherstate )
16: for (key, rg) ∈ otherstate do
17: myRg← state[key]
18: if myRg =⊥ then
19: state← state∪ {(key, rg)}
20: else
21: myRg.merge( rg )
copy only manipulates one predefined entry i in both arrays and its only possible to make
unitary increments and decrements, which are registered in the vectors P [i] and N [i]
accordingly.
Specifically, the inc operation issued at a copy that manipulates the entry i consists in
incrementing the entry P [i] and the dec operation consists in incrementing the entry N [i].
The absolute value of the counter is given by
∑
P [i]−N [i], i = 0, ...,N where N represents
the total number of copies of the counter. The merge operation between two PN-Counters
consists in calculating the maximum value for each entry of both vectors of each state.
In our version of the counter (Algorithm 18), we allow increments and decrements
of arbitrary values and, besides the vectors P and N , two auxiliary vectors are also kept,
MP and MN , which also have as many entries as the number of copies that exist of the
counter and each entry contains a time stamp that tracks when was the last update made
to the corresponding entry at vectors P and N respectively.
While the absolute value of the counter is computed exactly the same way as in the
PN-Counter, the inc and dec operation are slightly different in the sense that arbitrary
values for increments and decrements are allowed and that the auxiliary vectors MP and
MN are also modified. Specifically, the inc operation issued at a copy that manipulates
the entry i updates the time stamp stored in the entryMP [i] and the dec operation issued
at a copy that manipulates the entry i updates the time stamp stored in the entry MN [i].
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Algorithm 15 Add Wins Map - Part I
1: function AddWinsMap( )
2: state← {}
3:
4: function Put( key, val, ts )
5: if state[key] ,⊥ then
6: (val’, ts’, type)← state[key]
7: if ts ≥ ts′ then
8: state[key]← (val, ts, 1) . puts are operation type 1
9: else
10: state[key]← (val, ts, 1)
11:
12: function Remove( key, ts )
13: if state[key] ,⊥ then
14: (val, ts’, type)← state[key]
15: if ts ≥ ts′ ∨ (ts′ = ts∧ type , 1) then
16: state[key]← (⊥, ts, 0) . removes are operation type 0
17:
18: function Get( key )
19: if state[nKey] ,⊥ then
20: (val, ts, type)← state[key]
21: return val
22: else
23: return ⊥
24:
25: function Contains( key )
26: if state[key] ,⊥ then
27: (val, ts, type)← state[key]
28: if val ,⊥ then
29: return true
30: else
31: return false
32: else
33: return false
34:
35: function Size( )
36: return #GetAll()
37:
38: function GetAll( )
39: r← {}
40: for (key,val, ts, type) ∈ state do
41: if value ,⊥ then
42: r← r ∪{(key,val)}
43: return r
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Algorithm 16 Add Wins Map - Part II
1: function Merge( otherstate )
2: for (key,val, ts, type) ∈ otherstate do
3: if type = 1 then
4: Put( key, val, ts )
5: else if oT ype = 0 then
6: Remove( key, ts )
3.3.5.1 Counter SCRDT and Stub
The previously explained modifications where made in order to enable the creation of
the secure version of the counter. To support the inc and dec operations, an partial
homomorphic encryption scheme such as Paillier’s [48] is required so that it may be
possible to perform additions and subtractions over the ciphertext. Therefore the data
at vectors P and N must be stored under such scheme. However, as in the original PN-
Counter the merge operation consists in comparing the entries at these vectors in search
of the maximum entry, a problem arises as partial homomorphic encryption schemes do
not allow for such comparison to be made over its ciphertext.
Thus as an alternative, we created the additional vectors MP and MN to support the
merge operation. Specifically, the merge operation between two of our modified counters
consists in calculating the maximum value for each entry of vectors MP and MN and
maintaining the values of the corresponding entries at vectors P and N . This solution
works correctly because each replica only modifies one entry per auxiliary vector and
does so in an monotonically increasing way therefore it follows that given two vectors
MP and MP ′, if at an entry i MP [i] > MP ′[i] then P [i] > P ′[i] ( which is also applicable
for vectors MN and MN ′).
At last, allowing for arbitrary increments and decrements permits to obfuscate to an
extent an adversary that might be monitoring the computations in search for patterns to
learn information, such as a HbC cloud administrator, by hiding the fact that the state of
the counter changes in the same way every time an update operation is performed.
Algorithm 19 shows the pseudocode for the stub of the counter SCRDT.
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Algorithm 17 Map Stub
1: function MapStub( store, pwd, ivD, ivR )
2: Kd ← loadKey(store, pwd);
3: Kr ← loadKey(store, pwd);
4: IVd ← ivD;
5: IVr ← ivR;
6: service← getServiceEndpoint();
7:
8: function Put( Key, k, v )
9: k’← detEnc(Kd , IVd , k)
10: v’← rndEnc(Kr , IVr , v)
11: service.mapPut(Key, k’,v’)
12:
13: function Remove( Key, k )
14: k’← detEnc(Kd , IVd , k)
15: v← service.mapRemove(Key, k’)
16: if v ,⊥ then
17: return rndDec(Kr , IVr , v)
18: return ⊥
19:
20: function Contains( Key, k )
21: k’← detEnc(Kd , IVd , k)
22: return service.mapContains(Key, k’)
23:
24: function Get( Key, k )
25: k’← detEnc(Kd , IVd , k)
26: v← service.mapGet(Key, k’)
27: if v ,⊥ then
28: return rndDec(Kr , IVr , v)
29: return ⊥
30:
31: function GetAll( Key )
32: encState← service.mapGetAll(Key)
33: state← {}
34: for (k,v) ∈ encState do
35: k’← detDec(Kd , IVd , k)
36: v’← rndDec(Kr , IVr , v)
37: state← state ∪{(k′ ,v′)}
38: return state
39:
40: function Size( Key )
41: return service.mapSize(Key)
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Algorithm 18 Counter - Part I
1: function Counter( index )
2: i← index
3: p← {}
4: n← {}
5: mp← {} . Auxiliary structure for the p vector
6: mn← {} . Auxiliary structure for the n vector
7:
8: function Inc( delta )
9: ts←mp[i]
10: p[i]← p[i] + delta
11: mp[i]← generateTimestamp()
12:
13: function Dec( delta )
14: ts←mn[i]
15: n[i]← n[i] + delta
16: mn[i]← generateTimestamp()
17:
18: function Get( )
19: sumP← 0
20: sumN← 0
21: for id ∈ p do
22: sumP← sumP + p[id]
23: for id ∈ n do
24: sumN← sumN + n[id]
25: return sumP - sumN
26:
27: function Merge( p’, mp’, n’, mn’ )
28: for (id′ , ts′) ∈mp′ do
29: ts←mp[id’]
30: if ts′ > ts then
31: p[id’]← p’[id’]
32: mp[id’]←mp’[id’]
33: for (id′ , ts′) ∈mn′ do
34: ts←mn[id’]
35: if ts′ > ts then
36: n[id’]← n’[id’]
37: mn[id’]←mn’[id’]
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Algorithm 19 Counter Stub
1: function RegisterStub( p, q ) . p and q are paillier’s private numbers
2: pl← Paillier(p, q);
3: service← getServiceEndpoint();
4:
5: function Inc( Key, delta )
6: delta’← pl.Enc(delta)
7: service.counterInc(Key, delta’)
8:
9: function Dec( Key, delta )
10: delta’← pl.Enc(delta)
11: service.counterDec(Key, delta’)
12:
13: function Get( Key )
14: ctr← service.counterGet(Key)
15: return pl.Dec(ctr)
3.3.6 Security and critical analysis
Throughout the previous subsections we only discussed the encryption of the data that is
stored in the structures with no mention of the metadata that is also stored, namely the
time stamps and the type of operation. The main reason for this is that this information
is not worth to hide or obfuscate as its very difficult to hide from an adversary which
possesses access to the machines where the data store service is executing and that is
monitoring them in order to deduce information. For instance, this adversary could be
the cloud administrator which is an adversary we contemplate on our threat model.
When it comes to the encryption schemes that we leverage for our SCRDTs, the deter-
ministic encryption scheme is the one more prone to reveal information about the stored
data. Specifically it reveals repetitions in structures that admit repetition among their
elements, such as the list, and overall whether a given encrypted element belongs or not
in the structure. The first case is a direct consequence of the encryption scheme being
deterministic as it will always produce the same ciphertext for the same plaintext. The
second case is also a consequence of determinism but it also requires the adversary to
infer information about the type of computations that are being performed. Nonetheless
when the data is at rest, i.e. when no computations are being performed over it, and
in structures were no repetitions are allowed, the deterministic encryption scheme is as
secure as a probabilistic encryption scheme. If the data is not at rest, then the amount
of information revealed increases with the amount of operations performed. A possible
solution would be to periodically refresh the ciphertext by re-encrypting it with new
parameters. However, if there is a large amount of data this solution is not very practical
and may hinder the system’s availability.
The structures that use partial homomorphic and probabilistic encryption schemes
are by default more secure as these schemes present IND-CPA security levels [51].
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Implementation
In this chapter we discuss and present the implementation aspects of our solution. We
implemented our solution incrementally in two phases. First, we developed the library
that contained the data structures discussed in Section 3.3, both the secure (SCRDT) and
non-secure (CRDT) version. We developed our own set of structures as we could not find
an existing library of CRDTs in JAVA that featured the all the necessary structures.
Then we also developed a data store prototype which contained said structures. How-
ever, due to time constraints we could not completely consolidate the implementation
of the prototype in order to experimentally evaluate it. In Section 4.1 of this chapter we
present a description of said prototype.
As a programming language for both the library and prototype we used Java. For the
prototype we used the Akka toolkit [1]. Akka is an implementation of the Actor Model
proposed by Carl Hewitt [34] for the JVM that is geared towards the development of
applications that are highly concurrent, distributed and fault-tolerant. These are common
traits of a data store, hence our decision to us this toolkit for our prototype. Table 4.1
shows a summary of the technologies used.
Table 4.1: Summary of the technologies used.
Technology Version
Java 8
Akka 2.5.4
Google Protocol Buffers 3
The implementation of the library was straightforward given the pseudocode we have
already presented in Section 3.3, therefore we will not address it 1.
1The source code can be found at https://github.com/tavares-jdst/crypto_crdts.
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In Section 4.1 we discuss how we implemented our prototype using the aforemen-
tioned Akka toolkit modules. This prototype follows the system model shown in Section
3.1.
4.1 Data store prototype
To develop our prototype, we used three modules from the Akka toolkit: Distributed
Data, Cluster and HTTP. The Distributed Data module [3] offers eventually consistent,
high read and write available, low latency data (i.e. CRDTs). It also enables the creation
of custom distributed data and provides support for their usage and management in
distributed applications. This module proved to be crucial to integrate our CRDTs and
SCRDTs in our prototype.
The Cluster module [2] offers a membership service that is decentralized, fault-tolerant
and peer-to-peer that uses gossip protocols for communication among the cluster’s nodes
and an automatic failure detector. We took advantage of this module to build, deploy and
manage many replicas of the data store service in a seamless way.
The HTTP module [4], permits exporting the API of the data store service through a
REST web service thus enabling clients to use it.
In the rest of this section, we explain how each of these modules were used to develop
each component of our system.
Storage We developed this component using the Distributed Data module. Specifically,
we integrated our structures in this module by creating custom replicated data by extend-
ing two classes — AbstractReplicatedData and AbstractSerializationSupport. The
former class allowed to create the custom replicated data. The latter was required for
serialization as, per the documentation guidelines, the custom data must comply with the
Akka serializer. This class contains the logic to (de)serialize our structures under Google
Protocol Buffers (protobuf) [31].
Due to protobuf not supporting generic types and because there was an immutability
requirement for the custom replicated data, we had to adapt the implementation of our
structures. The update and merge operations of each structure return a new instance,
when previously they only altered the structure, to comply with the immutability re-
quirement. Then, we altered the CRDT structures so that they store pre-defined types.
In particular the map, register and set structures store strings whilst the counter stores
integers. We consider this last alteration to our solution acceptable as other in memory
key values such as Redis use a similar approach. For the SCRDT structures the imple-
mentation remained the same as they by default store a comparable byte array.
Replication Mechanism This component is fully supported by the Replicator actor
offered by the Distributed Data module. Each node of the system contains an instance of
this actor. Whenever a node of the system receives an operation over some structure from
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the client, the Replicator at that node is invoked and propagates the operation to the
majority of the cluster node’s by communicating with their instances of the Replicator.
If the operation is propagated to the majority of the replicas without a timeout occurring,
then it is considered to be successful.
The Replicator exports two operations for this purpose: update and get. Updates
are to be used whenever a modifying operation of a structure is invoked, in other words
updates are to be used to replicate the update operations of the structures. Gets are to
be used for obtaining the current state of a structure and therefore are to be used for the
query operations of a structure.
Data consistency is enforced through get operations of the Replicator. Upon receiv-
ing the current state of the structure from a majority of the replicas, all of the received
states are merged and the result of this operation is considered to be the current state of
the structure.
Client Interface To provide external access to the store service, each node has a service
endpoint configured which was implemented through extending the AllDirectives class
provided by the HTTP module. This class permits configuring routes that handle specific
requests. In our API we have one route for each the different structures, which in turn
have sub routes to support each of the structures’ operations.
Stubs This component is supported through using the HttpRequest and HttpResponse
provided by the HTTP module. As previously explained, there is a Stub for each type
of structure supported by our service that is responsible for transforming the client’s re-
quests and for issuing the transformed request to a given endpoint of our service through
the API exported by the Client Interface. The transformation consists in encrypting the
operation’s arguments under the appropriate encryption scheme which is selected based
on the structure it was issued upon.
Client The client component is a simple instance of an Akka actor which uses the Stubs
components to interact with the data store service. To issue requests to the system, clients
select at random an endpoint from a list of service endpoints available and then invoke
the intended operation through the Stubs component while providing the endpoint to be
used.
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Experimental Evaluation
In this chapter we present our experimental evaluation which consisted in performing
micro benchmarks to the developed structures. The experiment is detailed in Section 5.1
and it focuses on a pure performance comparison between the CRDTs and their SCRDT
counterparts to have an understanding of the impact of enhancing the structures with
security.
5.1 Micro benchmarks
This benchmark focuses on purely comparing the CRDTs and SCRDTs we developed
performance wise to have a first understanding in how they compare.
As such, each micro benchmark was executed in a local environment and each mea-
sured, for a given data structure, the average execution time of 1000 of each of its op-
erations. Beforehand, each data structure was populated with 1000 input data objects.
The benchmarks were performed in a machine running Ubuntu 16.04 with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-5200U 2.20GHz CPU and mSATA 256 GB SSD.
As input for the benchmarks we generated, from a base input string (for the sets, lists
and maps structures) or number (for the counter), a random and simple data set with
the required number of items to perform the operations, namely 1000. For instance, for
the add operation of a set and given an input string "benchmark", 1000 variations of this
string are created by simply adding a number from 1 up to 1000 to the string. All the
operations for each data structure were executed over a single replica, with the exception
of the merge operations where two replicas of the data structure were used.
As the benchmarks regarding the SCRDTs will include the appropriate encryption
and decryption operations, which is done at the client side, a performance penalty is
expected in the results when compared to the performance results of the corresponding
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CRDT.
The results obtained are show on tables 5.1 to 5.5.
Table 5.1: Map micro benchmarks results in µs/op.
Operation CRDT LWW SCRDT LWW CRDT AW SCRDT AW
Put 3.97 80.48 4.43 81.12
Remove 1.2 42.2 1.1 41.95
Get 0.65 46.9 0.8 46.37
Contains 0.78 41.24 0.58 40.09
GetAll 155.92 707.42 162.69 717.57
Merge 208.87 213.17 264.16 270.76
Table 5.2: Sets micro benchmarks results in µs/op (N/A = Non Applicable).
Operation CRDT
GSet
SCRDT
GSet
CRDT
LWW
SCRDT
LWW
CRDT
AW
SCRDT
AW
Add 2.34 45.35 8.4 51.7 43.68 83.55
Remove N/A N/A 1.21 42.83 12.63 57.62
Contains 0.54 43.31 0.96 43.17 3.19 44.17
GetAll 1.15 348.53 0.29 349.12 196.8 530.69
Merge 58.01 183.12 141.5 185.96 409.7 470.54
Table 5.3: Lists micro benchmarks results in µs/op.
Operation CRDT LWW SCRDT LWW CRDT AW SCRDT AW
Insert 197.11 247.54 207.95 256.1
Remove 185.8 229.03 187.64 233.5
Get 44.27 91.98 46.03 94.4
Contains 21.89 63.73 21.91 62.58
GetAll 56.71 368.87 58.3 371.04
Merge 35028.22 35219.48 34848.81 34940.21
5.1.1 Critical analysis
As expected the performance of the SCRDTs is overall worse then its CRDT counterpart.
In the map structure for the all of its operations with the exception of getall, the
execution time overhead of the SCRDT versions in comparison to their CRDT counterpart
is proportional to the number of encryption/decryption operations required and the time
these operations take. This proportion is also observable in the set and list structures.
For the getall operation in the map this observation is not applicable as, unlike the
remaining operations, the decryption of the elements requires to iterate over the whole
structure thus adding up the cost of searching the structures to the cost of the decryption
58
5.1. MICRO BENCHMARKS
Table 5.4: Register micro benchmarks
results in µs/op.
Operation CRDT SCRDT
Put 0.86 41.15
Get 0.37 48.84
Merge 0.87 1.11
Table 5.5: Counter micro benchmarks
results in µs/op.
Operation CRDT SCRDT
Inc 2.86 724.34
Dec 2.44 728.28
Get 18.91 2159.62
Merge 8.51 8.78
of every element. Nonetheless, the search and decryption steps were optimized to be
done in parallel if possible through the use of streams and lambda expressions. Hence
in the best scenario these execution time of these steps is the time of decrypting one
element if total parallelism is possible plus the time to iterate the structure. In the worst
scenario, it takes up to N times the time of decrypting one element if no parallelism is
possible, where N denotes the number of elements in the structure. This observation
is also valid for the getall operations of the the set and list structures. The register and
counter structures have only one query operation — get — that returns a single value,
therefore for these structures the execution time overhead of the SCRDT versions in
comparison to their CRDT counterpart is in fact proportional to the number of decryption
operations required and the time this operation takes.
The merge operation execution time is similar for each variant of the map CRDT
and SCRDT, which is to be expected as it doesn’t require any sort of encryption and it
depends solely on the size of the internal state of the map. When it comes to the merge
operations of the remaining structures, with the exception of the set, the execution times
are also very similar due to the same fact. In the set structure the difference of executions
times of the merge operations between the CRDT and SCRDT versions is unusually steep
and unexpected. Another noticeable aspect in the results of the merge operations, is
the values for the list structure which are very high yet expectable due to collisions of
elements stored at the same position in the different copies of list. For each collision, it is
necessary to compute a new composed identifier which is a fairly complex task (refer to
Section 3.3.2) thus it renders the merge quite slow. A final observation is that the counter
structure presents the biggest execution time disparity between its CRDT and SCRDT
versions. This overhead is expectable as the underlying cryptographic primitive for its
SCRDT version is Pailler’s encryption scheme and each operation performs sums over the
ciphertext using this primitive which is a computationally heavy operation.
Although there is an accentuated performance overhead between the CRDT and
SCRDT variants, the overhead resides at the client side. This means that on the server the
operations over the SCRDT structures have the same amount of execution time as their
CRDT counterparts and, consequently the throughput of the system where the SCRDTs
integrate would not be as hindered as expected. In conclusion, the attained results are
promising and show the potential benefits of the SCRDTs.
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Conclusion
The cloud computing paradigm is very popular and is an attractive solution to deploy
services that scale, are highly available and fault tolerant such as NoSQL data stores.
However with the rise of its popularity, the number of security-related incidents also in-
creased. Most of these incidents are associated to the privacy, confidentiality and integrity
of the data stored in the cloud. The attacks that lead to the incidents might not always be
carried out by outside attackers that wish to gain some knowledge about the data stored
in the cloud, but they might also be carried out by the cloud provider itself.
These factors hinder the user’s trust in cloud-based services, especially if the data
is considered to be critical as it would if the user is an health insurance company that
outsources their data in the cloud. For instance NoSQL data stores provide some security
mechanisms, but these are limited when compared to traditional relational databases.
In this thesis we proposed a set of secure data abstractions that enable trusted cloud
computation in the context of NoSQL data stores. Moreover, these abstractions also allow
for programmers to develop their own secure distributed applications. The abstractions
are a new set of secure conflict-free replicated data types, SCRDTs, which are security
enhanced through the use of cryptographic schemes, such as homomorphic and property-
preserving schemes, that enable their operations to be made over ciphertext.
To evaluate our solution we conducted micro benchmarks to compare each secure
abstraction with their non secure counterpart performance wise. The results of our ex-
periment shows that our abstractions provide the intended security requirements with
an acceptable performance overhead, showing that it has potential to be used to build
solutions for trusted cloud computation.
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6.1 Contributions
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis where:
• A new design of CRDTs that are security enhanced, SCRDTs, that perform their
operations over ciphertext and that allow to build secure distributed applications
and to perform trusted computations.
• Two libraries, one containing a set of CRDT structures and another containing the
secure version of the previous set of structures, the SCRDTs;
• A paper entitled "SCRDTs: Tipos de Dados Seguros e Replicados sem Conflitos"which
was accepted for the INForum 2018 conference, thus validating the contributions
of our solution for the scientific community.
6.2 Future Work
As in this thesis we focused primarily on state based replicated CRDTs and SCRDT, our
first proposal for future work would be to extend our solution to incorporate operation
based replicated CRDTs and SCRDTs so that it becomes even more rich and complete.
Our second proposal for future work is an iteration of the SCRDTs where instead of
providing security guarantees through only the use of cryptographic techniques, the
guarantees would be also provided through the use of trusted hardware technologies
(refer to Section 2.1).
Briefly, trusted hardware technologies enable the creation of TEEs that provide con-
fidentiality and integrity guarantees both to the input and output data and the compu-
tations that are performed within the environment. We shall focus on Intel SGX as the
trusted hardware technology because as previously discussed (refer to Sections 2.1.4.1
and 2.1.5), TPM’s are slow and inefficient which renders it inappropriate performance
wise and when compared to ARM’s Trustzone, Intel SGX it has a smaller TCB and a well
defined threat model,which are desirable traits.
To combine the cryptographic technologies and TEEs, we have two possible approaches
that differ in the way in which Intel SGX would be used in combination with some crypto-
graphic technology. The first approach would consist in combining partial homomorphic
and property preserving encryption with Intel SGX. Given a cloud provider which offers
nodes as computation resources that run on physical machines, which may or may not
enable the usage of Intel SGX, the update operations of the structures are either carried
out (i) using an enclave and over the encrypted data or (ii) outside an enclave and directly
over the encrypted data.
Naturally, if Intel SGX is available (this can be verified through reading a subset of
CPU registers [62]) then option (i) would take place, otherwise option (ii) would take
place. This approach not only allows for interoperability among both technologies, but
62
6.2. FUTURE WORK
it permits to obfuscate to a degree the HbC cloud adversary by minimizing leakage of
information upon executing computations. Specifically it allows to hide the nature of the
metadata that is generated upon the invocation of the update operation. This is possible
because the enclave is an environment that is completely isolated from the normal exe-
cution environment, therefore it cannot be monitored by an adversary that aims to infer
this information, such as the HbC cloud administrator.
The second approach would be to combine probabilistic encryption with Intel SGX.
Given a cloud provider which offers nodes as computation resources that run on physical
machines which enable the usage of Intel SGX, the operations of the structures are carried
out using an enclave and over unencrypted data. In this approach, the data is kept
encrypted under the aforementioned scheme if it is at rest. Upon an operation over
a structure, an enclave is created to execute it. Both the instruction to be executed
and the structure with the encrypted data are loaded to the enclave. To execute the
operation, first the data must be decrypted therefore the required cryptographic key
must be provided by the client. This can be done one of two ways, either the client may
send it over with each request through the TLS channel or the key may be already stored
and sealed within an enclave. Then after the instruction is carried out, the data of the
structure is re-encrypted before the structure is stored away. This approach, similarly to
the previous one, permits to obfuscates the HbC cloud adversary by hiding the nature of
the computations being performed as they are carried out within the enclave. But unlike
the previous solution, that uses property preserving encryption schemes, this one hides
completely patterns within the data that is kept in the structures due to the usage of the
probabilistic encryption scheme.
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